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Agriculture can be defined as the domestication and farming of plant and animal species to produce food 
and fiber products. Our society is fundamentally dependent on agriculture as it is the primary source of 
nutrients essential to human activities. Historically, the introduction of agriculture and technological 
development thereafter drastically changed the way human civilization has evolved into what it is today. 
New technologies allow farmers to produce more outputs with fewer inputs. Saved resources from 
agricultural production, such as land, labor and time, were used elsewhere to produce other goods and 
services that enrich the quality of our life.  
The primary focus of my dissertation is how new agricultural technology is adopted by U.S. 
farmers in the face of risk and uncertainty surrounding today’s agriculture. This dissertation contributes to 
the existing literature by reflecting the important recent trends in U.S. agriculture. In the first essay, I 
explore the implication of genetically modified crop varieties on farm households’ income from off-farm 
sources, which explains approximately 90 percent of total farm household income in the United States. 
The second essay studies the relationship between farm operators’ formal education and technology 
adoption. It reconsiders the conventional human capital theory and demonstrates that formal education 
can have a negative impact on technology adoption. The final essay focuses on the impact of farm 







Agriculture can be defined as the domestication and farming of animal and plant species to produce food 
and fiber products. Our society is fundamentally dependent on agriculture as it is the primary source of 
the nutrients essential to human activities. Historically, the introduction of agriculture, and technological 
developments thereafter, drastically changed the evolution of human civilization into what it is today. 
New technologies allow farmers to produce more outputs with less input. Resources conserved from 
agricultural production, such as land, labor and time, were used elsewhere to produce other goods and 
services that enrich the quality of our lives. 
1.1. Dissertation Overview 
The primary focus of this dissertation is the adoption of technology in agriculture in the United States. 
Decisions to adopt new technologies are complex due to factors such as temperature and rainfall, which 
are mostly determined by the whims of nature. Dynamic social changes due to population and economic 
growth in the United States also play an important role. Such factors pose significant challenges to 
farmers in assessing the profitability and applicability of new technology to the specific environmental 
and economic conditions under which they operate. Therefore, an understanding of the factors associated 
with technology adoption is crucially important for policy-makers to secure sufficient supplies of food 
and fiber products while conserving natural resources. This understanding also has significant 
implications for the well-being of the consumers whose lives are profoundly dependent on affordable 
foods that are healthy and of good quality.  
Technology adoption is one of the most widely studied topics in agricultural economics, dating 
back to the classic work by Griliches (1957) who studied the adoption of hybrid corn. In the simplest 
terms, technology adoption alters the production function, allowing farmers to produce more outputs with 
less input or lower costs. A great deal of empirical research has been devoted to this very topic to identify 
a wide range of factors that influence farmers’ decisions to adopt a variety of technologies under diverse 
production, economic, and environmental conditions. Feder and Umali (1993), Feder, et al. (1985), and 
Sunding and Zilberman (2001), among others, provide a thorough review of significant contributions to 
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this topic. The present dissertation contributes to the existing literature by reflecting upon recent trends in 
the US farm sector and their implications on technology adoption in agriculture.  
The first essay studies the implications of genetically modified (GM) crop varieties, which were 
commercially introduced to US agriculture in 1996, involving off-farm labor participation by US farm 
households. Among the recent innovations in agriculture that are generally management intensive, GM 
crops are unique in that they significantly reduce labor requirements (Smith, 2002). Given the fact that an 
increasing number of farmers report income from off-farm sources,1 the recent introduction of the time 
saving technology, and its widespread dissemination thereafter, is expected to have important 
implications for farm households’ time allocation decisions.  
The second essay builds on the first and focuses on the relationship between farm operators’ 
human capital and technology adoption. It reconsiders the conventional human capital theory that highly 
educated farmers are more likely to adopt new technologies in a more modern empirical framework in 
which such farmers are also likely to find more lucrative employment opportunities off the farm. 
Considering the fact that farm operators now account for a much smaller share of the total work force 
than in the past,2 while the number of college-educated farmers has been steadily increasing over the past 
five decades,3 the chapter revisits and gives new insights into the relationship between farm operators’ 
human capital and technology adoption in the contemporary U.S. farm sector. 
In the final essay, we explore the impact of farm producers’ attitudes toward risk on their use of 
various risk management strategies. Risk and uncertainty play a significant role in almost every aspect of 
our lives. Understanding individual attitudes towards risk is crucial for successful public policy                                                         
1 In 2002, 93% of farm households reported off-farm income, up from 54% in 1970 (Dimitri et al., 2005). Mishra et 
al. (2002) reported that income from off-farm sources explained approximately 90% of total farm household income 
in 1999. 
2 Dimitri et al. (2005) provides a detailed account of the structural changes the US farm sector has experienced since 
the beginning of the 20th century. In 1900, farm labor explained 41% of the total U.S. workforce. The number 
continually declined over the course of the century: 21.5% in 1930, 4% in 1970, and 1.9% in 2002. The share of 
GDP contributed from the farm sector followed suit, accounting for 7.7% of total GDP in 1930, 2% in 1970, and 
0.7% in 2002.  
3
 Mishra et al. (2009) reported, from the 2004 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, that only 10 percent of 
farm operators had either attended or graduated from college in 1964 whereas the analogous figure rose to 48 
percent in 2004. 
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interventions (Dohmen, et al., 2011, Weber, 2010). The central difficulty in risk research in agricultural 
economics is how to measure individual risk attitudes. A wide variety of methods have been proposed to 
measure farmers’ risk attitudes, but often provide empirical results inconsistent with theoretical 
expectations (Fausti and Gillespie, 2006, Lagerkvist, 2005). Given the recent findings in economics and 
labor economics literature that a simple qualitative measure of risk attitudes can be the most versatile 
predictor of risky behaviors (Dohmen, et al., 2005, 2011), in this chapter, we will examine the validity of 
the same qualitative measure of risk attitudes used in these studies using data from a nationwide survey of 
farm households in the United States.  
1.2. Theoretical Framework 
The underlying theoretical framework in this dissertation is agricultural household models. The hallmark 
of agricultural household models is that the budget constraint is assumed endogenous unlike in the 
standard consumer model (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). According to Taylor and Adelman (2003), 
agricultural household models were first developed by Kuroda and Yotopoulos (1978) in an attempt to 
explain the absence of a positive effect of a commodity price increase on a market surplus of the 
commodity in rural Japan. This counterintuitive phenomenon is attributed to the profit effect (Singh, et al., 
1986, Taylor and Adelman, 2003). In a neoclassical economic framework, where perfect information and 
zero transaction costs are assumed, an increase in a commodity price should unambiguously decrease 
demand for the commodity, assuming that it is a normal good. In the agricultural household model where 
a farm household plays the dual role of both consumer and producer, the price increase also invokes the 
profit effect as it enhances farm revenue and thus farm household income. This shifts the household’s 
budget constraint outward and so does the demand curve for the commodity. Combined with the negative 
income and substitution effects, the net effect of the price increase on commodity demand becomes 
ambiguous in the presence of the profit effect. The own price elasticity of food demand can be positive 
when the profit effect outperforms the income and substitution effects, and if this is the case, it may 
decrease food supply in the market to the extent that the market is imperfect.  
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This example sheds light on the fundamental objective of agricultural household models. The 
raison d'etre of agricultural household models is to construct a theoretical framework to predict the effects 
of exogenous shocks to the farm sector (Singh, et al., 1986, Taylor and Adelman, 2003). Agricultural 
household models have been used as the building block of empirical research in the fields of agricultural 
economics. The models have been used in a wide range of applications including technology adoption, 
off-farm labor supply, migration, and income distribution (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). Chapters 2 and 3 
discuss the applications of agricultural household models relevant to off-farm labor supply and farm 
operators’ human capital, respectively, in the context of technology adoption. 
1.3. Data 
All the empirical analyses in this dissertation rely on data from the Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS), a national survey conducted annually by the Economic Research Service (ERS) and the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service. The ARMS collects data to measure the financial conditions, 
operating characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricultural commodities, and the well-
being of farm operator households.  The ARMS also collects information on farm households, including 
detailed information on off-farm hours worked by farm operators and their spouses and the amount of 
income received from off-farm work. 
The target population of the ARMS is operators associated with farm businesses representing 
agricultural production in the 48 contiguous states. A farm is defined as an establishment that sold or 
normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the year.  Farms can be 
organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, family corporations, non-family corporations, or 
cooperatives. Data is collected from one operator per farm, the senior farm operator. A senior farm 
operator is the operator who makes the majority of the day-to-day management decisions. Throughout 
this dissertation, operator households organized as nonfamily corporations or cooperatives and farms run 
by hired managers were excluded.   
The ARMS has a complex stratified and multi-frame design and each observation in the ARMS 
represents a number of similar farms, the particular number being the survey expansion factor (or the 
5 
 
inverse of the probability of the surveyed farm being selected for surveying). The complex survey design 
as well as the cross-sectional nature of the data requires an appropriate technique to estimate standard 
errors to account for potential heteroskedasticity. Although the delete-a-group jackknife procedure is the 
standard approach to obtain variance of estimated parameters, the obvious drawback is the small number 
of replication (Panel to Review USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2007). Its validity is 
also in question when only a subset of the ARMS is used (Dubman, 2000, El-Osta, 2011, Goodwin, et al., 
2003) as in all econometric analyses in this dissertation. El-Osta (2011) demonstrated that the jackknife 
estimation method tended to underestimate standard errors, relative to those obtained using the bootstrap 
method (Efron, 1982) or the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967, White, 1980). This is 
of great concern especially when interpreting statistical results with borderline significance at the 
conventional levels (El-Osta, 2011). 
Following the recent applications of the ARMS data in published studies (El-Osta, 2011, Mishra 
and El-Osta, 2008, Mishra, et al., 2010), all econometric analyses in this dissertation employ the robust 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator for standard errors estimation, unless otherwise noted. An exception is 
made in Chapter 4 when standard errors of the marginal effects in a double-hurdle model are calculated, 
for which the bootstrap method is recommended. 
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CHAPTER 2: DOES “CO
VE
IE





The adoption of genetically modified (GM) crop varieties has increased rapidly since they were 
commercially introduced to US agriculture in 1996, due to higher expected yields, lower input costs,  and 
fewer labor requirements (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006, Fernandez-Cornejo, et al., 2001). For 
example, in 2005, only 10 years after they were commercially introduced, herbicide-tolerant (HT) 
soybeans accounted for 85% of the total soybean acreage in the United States (Fernandez-Cornejo and 
Caswell, 2006). This rapid increase in the adoption of GM crops is a clear manifestation that perceived 
benefits from GM crops significantly outweigh additional costs incurred for a wide spectrum of potential 
adopters. The diffusion path that GM crops has taken so far in the United States stands in stark contrast to 
those taken by other technologies. While other recent innovations in agriculture, such as precision 
farming technologies, integrated pest management, and soil testing, often require more managerial time 
by farm operators, GM crops are management-saving (Smith, 2002). HT crop varieties, the most widely 
and rapidly adopted GM crops in the United States, significantly reduce labor requirements for weed 
control as they have been developed to survive the application of herbicides that previously would have 
damaged the crop as well as the targeted weeds (Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2000). The simplicity 
and flexibility of GM crops relative to conventional crop varieties allow farmers to save labor and 
managerial time thereby improving efficiency of farming operation (Smith, 2002). 
An important question arises as to how time savings made possible by the adoption of GM crops 
are allocated by farm households, especially by farm operators and their spouses.  Theoretically, rational 
economic agents allocate their time across various activities so as to maximize their total utility. Thus, a 
natural consequence of adopting GM crops—a primary example of what Smith (2002) calls “convenience 
agriculture” technology—for farm operators and their spouses would be either (1) further expansion of 
the farm enterprise, (2) an increased off-farm labor supply, (3) increasing leisure time or (4) a 
combination of any or all of the above.  
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However, empirical evidence on the impact of the rapid increase in GM crop adoption on labor 
allocation decisions by farm households is scarce and inconsistent.  While earlier studies found no 
evidence of correlations between GM crop adoption and off-farm labor supply (Fernandez-Cornejo, et al., 
2001, Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2000), more recently, Fernandez-Cornejo, et al. (2005) and 
Fernandez-Cornejo (2007) found a positive correlation between the adoption of  HT crops and off-farm 
income, postulating that the increase in total income is due to greater off-farm labor supply. 
In addition, most studies on this topic do not account for the joint nature of farm households’ 
labor allocation decisions in estimating the impact of GM crop adoption. For example, Fernandez-
Cornejo (2007) conjectured that the increase in off-farm income was a result of increased hours of off-
farm work, but did not estimate off-farm labor supply by operators, their spouses or both.  This is of great 
concern, considering the ample empirical evidence that off-farm labor allocation decisions between 
operators and their spouses were jointly determined (Gould and Saupe, 1989, Kimhi, 2004, Kimhi, 1994, 
Kwon, et al., 2003, Tokle and Huffman, 1991). 
Herein lie the objectives of our analysis. First, we estimate the impact of GM crop adoption on 
off-farm labor supply by US farm households, allowing for the joint process through which operators and 
their spouses allocate their time between on- and off-farm work.  In doing so, we expand the scope of 
existing studies and examine the degree to which the intensity of GM crop adoption, in terms of a share of 
GM crops acres (corn and soybeans) over total corn and soybean acres, influences off-farm labor supply 
as determined by farm operators and their spouses.
2.2. Conceptual Framework 
Farm households’ decisions about technology adoption and off-farm labor supply can be well represented 
in the context of the agricultural household model (Fernandez-Cornejo, et al., 2005, Huffman, 1991, 
Sumner, 1982) in which the farm household is assumed to maximize utility, , subject to three 
constraints: time, budget, and production.  The objective function is given by 
   = 	




 is a composite good purchased by the farm household for direct or indirect consumption,  is a 
column vector4 of leisure time for the operator and the spouse ( = 	, ′),5 and  represents a 
vector of other exogenous factors that influence the household’s utility such as family characteristics.6  
The time constraint for the household is given as: 
  =   =  +  +  +  +   =  +  + , (2) 
where time endowment given to the farm household consists of those for the operator and the spouse, 
each of which can be distributed among three activities: on-farm work, off-farm work, and leisure.  These 
three activities are denoted by subscripts, “ !,” “ "",” and “#.” Assuming that all household income is 
going to be spent, the budget constraint is given by 
 $%
 = $&' − )*+ , + -+ + ., (3) 
where $%, $& and )* are, respectively, prices of 
, ', and ,, ' is a composite farm output, and , is a 
vector of farm inputs, - is a vector of off-farm wage for the operator and the spouse (- = / , /′′), 
 is a vector of off-farm labor supply by the operator and the spouse ( = 	 ,  ’), and . 
consists of all other sources of income such as interest and government transfers.  To accommodate the 
assumption that all farm household income is spent, one can assume that the composite good, 
, includes 
a variety of financial services including savings and investments. Note that $&
 − )*′ , represents the net 
farm household income and -′ is the total off-farm income for the household.7   
The production technology constraint can be represented as 
 ' = '0,	Γ, 	Γ, , Γ, 23,   Γ ≥ 0, (4) 
                                                        
4 All of the characters in bold font represent a column vector unless otherwise noted. 
5 Superscripts “O” and “S” denote “operators” and “spouses” respectively throughout this chapter.  	 ′ 
indicates that it is a 2 × 1 column vector. 
6 Following Hallberg et. al., (1991) we assume that farm household utility is determined by decisions and economic 
activities by the operator and the spouse.  Any contribution to the household utility by any other members of the 
family belongs . 
7 -′ = 	/  /   = / + / .  
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where Γ is the intensity of technology adoption (i.e., the share of GM crops in this study),  is a vector of 
human capital for the operator and the spouse ( = < , <′, and R is a vector of exogenous factors 
pertinent to agricultural operation such as the site specific environmental factors and climatic conditions. 
Substituting the production technology constraint given by equation (4) into equation (3), we can obtain 
the technology constrained net household income due to Huffman (1991):  
 $%
 = $&='0,	Γ, 	Γ, , Γ, R3? − )*+ , + -+ + .. (5) 
The Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are obtained by maximizing the Lagrangian function that 
incorporates the utility function, the budget constraint that accounts for the production function, and the 
time constraint given by equations (1), (5) and (2), respectively: 
 
# = 	
, , Φ + AB$&='0,	Γ, 	Γ, , Γ, R3? − )*+ , + -+ + . − $%
C 
+D′E −  −  − F (6) 
Some of the first order conditions are 
 G#G
 = GG
 −  A$& = 0 (7) 
 G#GH =  A I$& G'G, − )*J = 0 (8) 
 G#GΓ = A K$& LIG'G,J+ IG,GΓJ + I G'GJ+ IGGΓ J + G'GΓM − -′ G,GΓN − D′ GGΓ ≤ 0 (9) 
 G#G = A P$& G'GQ − D ≤ 0 (10) 
 G#G = A- − D ≤ 0 (11) 
 G#G = GG − D = 0, (12) 
where A and D are the Lagrange multipliers.  Note that D is not a scalar but a 2 × 1 vector, with each 
element being the shadow price of time for the operator and the spouse. Equality in the first order 
condition indicates that we a priori expect an interior solution. For example, rearranging equation (10), 




DA ≥ $& G'G (13) 
The left hand side of equation (13) is the ratio of the shadow prices of time and the net farm household 
income, which represents the marginal rate of substitution between the two shadow prices for both 
operators and spouses.  The right hand side of equation (13) is the marginal value product of on-farm 
labor, again for both operators and spouses.  Within the range that D, A and $& RSR are all positive, 
equality in equation (13) assures that the optimizing behavior takes place at a point where a positive 
amount of ' is produced and thus a positive amount of labor is supplied by both the operator and the 
spouse.  Although past literature usually maintains equality in equation (10), we adopt inequality to 
account for the possibility that there may be some operators who do not work off the farm or spouses who 
do not work on the farm. 
Following Fernandez-Cornejo, et al. (2005), the optimality condition for the intensity of 
technology adoption, Γ, can be obtained by rearranging equation (9): 
 $& LIG'G,J+ IG,GΓJ + I G'GJ+ IGGΓ J + G'GΓM − -′ G,GΓ − D′A GGΓ ≤ 0  
 $& PT'TΓQ − -+ G,GΓ − D′A GGΓ ≤ 0, (14) 
where 
USUΓ = RSR,′ R,RΓ +  RSR′ RRΓ  + RSRΓ.  The first term on the left hand side in equation (14) is the 
value of marginal product due to an incremental change in the adoption intensity. The second and the 
third terms, respectively, represent the marginal input cost and the marginal cost of on-farm labor, both of 
which are due to the incremental change in the adoption intensity. When equality holds in equation (14), 
there is going to be a positive level of technology adoption at the equilibrium. 
Given the optimal intensity of technology adoption, Γ∗, off-farm labor supply can be obtained by 
substituting in the optimal levels of on-farm labor and leisure into equation (2).  That is, 
 ∗ 	Γ =  − 0∗ 	Γ∗ + ∗ 3. (15) 
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 Equation (15) is the model of our interest, consisting of two-stage off-farm labor supply equations, 
with the first stage pertaining to the optimal intensity of technology adoption, Γ∗. Our empirical model, 
introduced in Section 2.4, will first estimate the optimal adoption intensity, Γ∗, so that its predicted value 
can be used as an instrument to estimate off-farm labor supply equations by both operators and their 
spouses. 
2.3. Data 
This study employs data from a nationwide Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 2004-
2006, developed by the Economic Research Service (ERS) and the National Agricultural Statistical 
Service (NASS). The ARMS survey is designed to link data on the resources used in agricultural 
production to data on use of technologies, including GM crops. The 2004-2006 ARMS queried farmers 
on all types of financial, production, and household activities, such as labor allocation and consumption 
expenditures. Specifically, it is used to gather information about the relationships among agricultural 
production, resources, and the environment.  The ARMS is also used to determine production costs and 
returns of agricultural commodities and measures net farm income of farm businesses. Another aspect of 
ARMS’s important contribution is the information it provides on the characteristics and financial 
conditions of farm households, including information on input and risk management strategies and off-
farm income.  
Operators associated with farm businesses representing agricultural production across the United 
States are the target population in the survey. USDA defines a farm as an establishment that sold or 
normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the year. Farms can be organized 
as sole proprietorships, partnerships, family corporations, nonfamily corporations, or cooperatives. Data 
are collected from one operator per farm, the senior farm operator, who makes most of the day-to-day 
management decisions. For the purpose of this study, operator households organized as nonfamily 
corporations or cooperatives and farms not growing cash grains were excluded. We selected farms that 
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planted at least one acre of either corn or soybeans in the observation year. After deleting observations 
with missing values, a total of 4,394 observations are utilized in this study.8 
Since the ARMS data has a complex survey design and is cross-sectional, it raises the possibility 
that the error terms in regression models are heteroscedastic. Although the delete-a-group Jackknife 
method is suitable for estimation of standard errors when the dataset has a complex survey design, its 
validity is in question when only a subset of the ARMS is used (Dubman, 2000) Accordingly, all standard 
errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticiy using the Huber-White sandwich robust variance estimator 
based on algorithms contained in STATA (Huber, 1967, White, 1980). 
Table 2.1provides a list of variables and their definitions used in this study, and a comparison of 
means between adopters and non-adopters of GM crops. The second, third, and fourth column show 
means of each variable for the entire sample, adopters, and non-adopters, respectively. The last column 
provides a Z statistic (Chi-square statistic) from the test of equal mean between the adopters and non-
adopters for continuous (discrete) variables. In our sample, the adoption rate of GM crops (either corn or 
soybeans) is 63%. Note that this figure is considerably lower than often published figures such as GM 
soybeans accounting for 85% of the total soybean acres in the United States in 2005 (Fernandez-Cornejo 
and Caswell, 2006), which we cited in the introduction. Figures such as this one are based on the total 
acreage and thus it is likely that the adoption rate of 85% is mostly explained by very large-scale 
operations. On the other hand, the figure in Table 2.1 is based on the number of operators who adopt GM 
crops; it simply claims that GM corn or soybeans is adopted by 63% of family farms that grew at least 
one acre of corn or soybeans in the observation year, which include farms of different sizes. Z and chi-
square statistics in the last column are mostly significant at the 1% level, which validates the relevance of 
variables used in this study in explaining the adoption of GM crops. A simple comparison of 
                                                        
8 For the purpose of the study, the sample consists of farm households with operators and their spouses. After 
deleting observations with missing values, we attempted to delete observations of farm households without a spouse, 
but all such observations had already been excluded from the sample. Consequently, no observations were deleted 
for not having a spouse. Readers should be warned that the target population in this study is farm households 
operated by a married couple and results may be subject to a sample selection effect of unknown degree in light of 
the entire farm population. 
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unconditional means between adopters and non-adopters demonstrates, for example, that, for farms 
adopting GM crops, operators and their spouses are less educated, older, and work longer hours off-farm.9 
For both categories, the spouses work much longer hours off-farm and the difference is more conspicuous 
for farms that do not adopt GM crops.  




GM Crop Adoption Z/Chi-2 
Statistics Yes No 
GM Corn (=1 if adopted either GM corn or 
soybeans, 0 otherwise) 
0.627 1 0   
Share of GM Corn Acres in Total Corn Acres 0.499 0.796 0   
Operator Characteristics      
Operator's Off-farm work hours (average per week) 7.238 8.809 6.306 5.293 *** 
Operator's Years of formal education 12.803 12.476 12.998 -9.885 *** 
Operator's Age 52.877 53.551 52.469 2.9386 *** 
Spouse Characteristics       
Spouse's Off-farm work hours (average per week) 17.620 16.598 18.217 -2.6858 *** 
Spouse's Years of formal education 13.120 12.814 13.303 -9.014 *** 
Spouse's Age 50.433 50.987 50.098 2.5834 *** 
Farm Characteristics       
Total operated acres (in 1,000 acres) 1.238 0.886 1.448 -7.7982 *** 
Entropy Index (continuous, 0 not diversified at all, 
1 completely diversified) 
0.280 0.271 0.285 -3.9735 *** 
Government payments (=1 if received, 0 otherwise) 0.891 0.814 0.938 162.3779 *** 
Debt to Asset Ratio = Total Liability/ Total Asset 0.183 0.158 0.198 -2.5802 *** 
Dairy (=1 if dairy is primary enterprise, 0 
otherwise) 
0.282 0.334 0.252 34.2763 *** 
Number of children 13 years old or younger 0.673 0.720 0.645 1.9323 *** 
Household net worth ($1,000) 1773.479 1615.277 1867.744 -3.3695 * 
Regional Dummy Variables (=1 if farm is located in respective region, 0 otherwise) 
Heartland 0.296 0.266 0.314 11.5079 *** 
Northern Crescent 0.278 0.299 0.266 5.6638 ** 
Northern Great Plains 0.038 0.027 0.044 7.3717 *** 
Prairie Gateway 0.076 0.049 0.091 25.5669 *** 
Eastern Upland 0.073 0.092 0.063 12.4496 *** 
Southern Sea Board 0.105 0.113 0.099 2.1576  
Fruitful Rim 0.069 0.108 0.046 62.0403 *** 
Basin and Range 0.016 0.021 0.013 3.4582 * 
Mississippi Portal 0.049 0.024 0.064 34.2661 *** 




Table 2.1 cont’d 
Variable Definition Entire 
Sample 
GM Crop Adoption Z/Chi-2 
Statistics Yes No 
County Level Variables      
Unemployment Rate 5.246 5.360 5.178 3.3521 *** 
Metro (=1 if located in metro county, 0 otherwise) 0.359 0.403 0.332 22.8672 *** 
Soil Productivity Index 74.657 72.390 76.006 -8.6816 *** 
Average Rainfall 930.422 940.248 924.496 1.7545 * 
Coefficient of Variation in Rainfall 0.041 0.051 0.035 6.3355 *** 
Amenity Index (ordinal, 1 = lowest, 7= highest) 3.047 3.174 2.971 6.9372 *** 
Observation Years      
2004 0.330 0.322 0.342 1.852  
2005 0. 356 0.335 0.390 13.789 *** 
2006 0.314 0.343 0.268 27.108 *** 
Number of Observations 4394 2755 1639   
1
For continuous variables, Z-statistics from t-test is presented. For discrete variables, chi-square statistics is used. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
2.4. Empirical Framework 
The empirical model consists of three equations: weekly off-farm work hours by operators and spouses 
and the adoption intensity of GM crops represented by the share of GM crop acres in the total crop acres. 
Based on the theoretical model above, we can express the intensity of GM crop adoption and labor 
allocation model as follows: 
 
XY =     = Z X[ + \+,] + ^Y if XY∗ > 00 if XY∗ ≤ 0 (16) 
 
Xb =      = c X[ + d+,e + ^b if Xb∗ > 00 if Xb∗ ≤ 0 
 
(17) 
 X[ =      = 	fY fb XYXb + g+,h + ^[ if X[∗ > 00 if X[∗ ≤ 0, (18) 
 
where XY and  Xb are, respectively, weekly off-farm work hours by operators and their spouses and X[ is 
the adoption intensity of GM crops while XY∗, Xb∗, and X[∗ are the corresponding latent variables; Z and c 
are coefficients of the adoption intensity of GM crops in respective labor supply equations for operators 
and their spouses;  f, \, d, and g are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated; ,], ,e, and ,h are 
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vectors of exogenous variables.  The error terms, εY, εb and ε[ are assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero means but εY and εb are assumed to be correlated at m. 
To choose an appropriate econometric estimation procedure, the Smith-Blundell test of 
exogeneity (Smith and Blundell, 1986) is conducted to test the null hypothesis that the adoption intensity 
of GM crops (y[) is exogenous to off-farm labor participation decisions (XY and  Xb) in equations (16) and 
(17), using STATA command, tobexog, developed by Baum (1999). The test first estimates equation (18) 
without XY and  Xb. ,h includes all the exogenous variables in ,] and ,e as well as four external 
exogenous variables that are not in ,] and ,e, serving as instruments. The four external instruments are 
soil productivity index, average rainfall, the coefficient of variation in rainfall, and the amenity index,10 
all of which are county-level aggregate variables.11 The test then estimates equations (16) and (17) 
including the residuals from the first stage. If the residual term obtains a significant coefficient, it 
indicates that the adoption intensity of GM crops is endogenous to off-farm labor participation decisions. 
The test results indicate that the adoption intensity of GM crops is not endogenous to operators’ off-farm 
labor supply, but it is to their spouses’.12  
With this result, we employ the two-step estimation procedure described in Nelson and Olson 
(1978) that yields asymptotically consistent estimates of unknown parameters. First, we estimate the 
reduced form of equation (18) from which the endogenous variables, yY and ybare absent and exogenous 
variables. Since the dependent variable, the share of GM crop acres in total crop acres, is censored from 
below at zero and above at one, we employ a double-censored Tobit estimation procedure to estimate the 
reduced form of equation (18). The second step involves estimation of equations (16) and (17) by a 
bivariate Tobit model. The linear prediction of the latent variable of the adoption intensity of GM crops 
from the first-stage Tobit model is used here to represent the intensity at which the farm household is                                                         
10 The amenity index is developed by McGranahan (1999). It captures environmental attributes of farmland such as 
climate, topography, and water area that are highly correlated with farmland values. For more details, see 
McGranahan (1999). 
11 We expect these variables representing environmental conditions surrounding the farm to be correlated with the 
adoption of GM crops, but not with off-farm labor decisions. 
12 For operators’ labor supply equation, F-statistic is 0.058 (p-value = 0.809). For their spouses’, F-statistic is 8.476 
(p-value = 0.004). 
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willing to and capable of adopting GM crops. The vectors of exogenous variables, o] and oe, in equation 
(16) and (17) are two sets of variables influencing off-farm labor supply decisions for operators and 
spouses, respectively.13 Operators and spouse characteristics include years of formal education, age, and 
age squared, with the expectation that younger or more educated farmers (both operators and spouses) are 
more likely to work more off-farm. 
Farm characteristics include total operated acres, total operated acres squared, the entropy index 
of enterprise diversification, 14 a dummy variable for receiving government payments, and a dummy 
variable for farms whose primary enterprise is dairy. While we expect farms receiving government 
payments to work less off-farm, other farm characteristics may have negative impacts on off-farm labor 
supply; high labor requirements due to a large number of operated acres, diversification across enterprises 
and dairy farming can be an obstacle to seek off-farm employment. Debt to asset ratio and household net 
worth are included to control for the effect of the farm’s financial well-being on off-farm labor 
participation. Although farms with high net worth are hypothesized to work less off-farm, the sign of debt 
to asset ratio is a priori ambiguous; higher financial leverage may induce farm operators to seek stable 
sources of income off-farm, while it may be a consequence of large investments into the farm operation, 
an indication of a commitment to farm business. Finally, we include the number of children 13 years old 
or younger to assess the relationship between the need for childcare and parents’ work behaviors.  
To capture regional characteristics that cannot be captured by all other variables, we include 
dummy variables representing the farm resource region defined by USDA (2010)15 as well as county-
level unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011). We also include dummy 
variables representing observation years to control for any time-variant exogenous shocks to labor market 
conditions. 
                                                        
13 The only difference between the two vectors is that o] contains age, education and off-farm working experience 
for operators while oe contains those variables for spouses. 14 The entropy index is a measure of diversification that ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a farm producing only 
one commodity and 1 indicating a completely diversified farm. See Jinkins (1992) and Harwood et al. (1999) for 
more details. 




Figure 2.1: USDA Farm Resource Regions  
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Double-censored Tobit Model 
Econometric results for the first stage double-censored Tobit model of the adoption intensity of GM crops 
are presented in Table 2.2. We briefly review the results. Operator and spouse characteristics are largely 
insignificant, with the only exception being spouses’ years of formal education. Most farm characteristics, 
in contrast, obtained a significant coefficient. The lack of significance of operator and spouse 
characteristics may be due to the ease of adoption GM crops, unlike other innovations that are more 
management-intensive (Smith, 2002). Relative to the base category of the Heartland region, five out of 
eight regional dummy variables obtained a significant coefficient, indicating the importance of regional 
characteristics in explaining GM crop adoption. Soil productivity index has a positive and significant 
coefficient; farms located in a county with high soil productivity are more likely to adopt GM crops. 
Average rainfall does not have an effect on GM crop adoption but its coefficient of variation does; farms 
in a county with variable rainfall patterns are less likely to adopt GM crops. Relative to the base year of 
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2006, GM crop adoption is less likely to occur in 2004 and 2005, which is consistent with the steadily 
increasing rate of GM crop adoption over the years.  
2.5.2. Bivariate Tobit Model 
Table 2.3 presents parameter estimates of the second-stage bivariate Tobit model of off-farm labor supply 
by farm operators and spouses, corresponding to equations (16) and (17), respectively. The estimated 
value of m is 0.171. The chi-square statistic of 0.171 (p-value < 0.00) from the likelihood ratio test of m = 
0 indicates that the error terms in the two equations are correlated at a significant level. This validates use 
of the bivariate Tobit model instead of two separate Tobit models. The last column in Table 2.3 shows 
chi-square statistics from the test that compares equality of the coefficient estimates in the two equations. 
A significant chi-square statistics indicates that the explanatory variable has different impacts on off-farm 
labor supply by operators and their spouses.  However, these factors appear to play distinctive roles in 
explaining off-farm labor supply by operators and their spouses, according to the significant chi-square 
statistics on personal and farm characteristics.  
Coefficient estimates from Tobit models represent marginal effects of the latent variables (XY∗ and Xb∗ in equations (16) and (17) in this study). But this quantity is not of our interest because the latent 
variables are not observable to the researchers (Greene, 2008). For variables with a significant coefficient 
estimate in the bivariate Tobit model, Table 2.4 provides two types of marginal effects, following the 
McDonald and Moffitt decomposition (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980).16 The second and fourth columns 
represent the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of working off-farm by 
operators and their spouses, respectively.  The third and fifth columns are, respectively, the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables on the weekly off-farm work hours by the operators and their spouses 
who have positive off-farm work hours. 
The primary interest in this study is how the adoption intensity of GM crops, represented by the 
share of GM crop acres, is related to off-farm labor supply measured by weekly off-farm work hours by 
                                                        
16 Marginal effects are estimated at the means of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 2.2: Factors Affecting Adoption of GM Crop Varieties by Two-limit Tobit Model 
Variables Coefficient  Standard Errors 
Operator Characteristics 
Operator's Years of Formal Education 0.012 (0.011) 
Operator's Age -0.011 (0.015) 
Operator’s Age Squared 0.000 (0.000) 
Spouse Characteristics 
Spouse's Years of Formal Education 0.026 (0.010)** 
Spouse's Age -0.003 (0.015) 
Spouse’s Age Squared 0.000 (0.000) 
Farm Characteristics 
Total Operated Acres 0.031 (0.000)*** 
Total Operated Acres Squared -0.000 (0.000) ** 
Entropy Index  0.181 (0.128) 
Government Payments (=1 if received, 0 otherwise) 0.503 (0.052) *** 
Debt To Asset Ratio 0.085 (0.048) * 
Dairy (=1 if Dairy is primary enterprise, 0 otherwise) -0.243 (0.037) *** 
Number of Children 13 Years Old or Younger -0.039 (0.015) *** 
Household Net Worth ($1,000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Regional Dummy Variables (Heartland region is the base category.) 
Northern Crescent -0.050 (0.048) 
Northern Great Plains 0.068 (0.091) 
Prairie Gateway 0.122 (0.065) * 
Eastern Upland -0.124 (0.068) * 
Southern Sea Board 0.203 (0.072) *** 
Fruitful Rim -0.296 (0.099) *** 
Basin and Range -0.018 (0.164) 
Mississippi Portal 0.401 (0.088) *** 
County Level Variables 
Unemployment Rate 0.000 (0.010) 
Metro -0.015 (0.031) 
Soil Productivity Index 0.005 (0.002) *** 
Average Rainfall 0.000 (0.000) 
Coefficient of Variation in Rainfall -0.495 (0.286) * 
Amenity Index (ordinal, 1 = lowest, 4 = highest) -0.008 (0.023) 
Observation Years 
2004 -0.135 (0.037) *** 
2005 -0.103 (0.038) *** 
Intercept -0.045 (0.347) 
Number of Observations = 4,395 Likelihood Ratio Chi-2(30) = 605.92 
Log pseudo likelihood = -4433.002 Prob > F =0.000  




Table 2.3: Factors Affecting Off-farm Labor Supply by Bivariate Tobit Model 
Variables 
Operators Spouses 
Chi-21 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Share of GM Crop Acres  
in Total Crop Acres 2.370 (13.754) 24.789*** (8.886) 1.97 
Personal Characteristics    
Years of formal education 1.797*** (0.646) 4.416*** (0.441) 11.49*** 
Age 2.351*** (0.591) 3.469*** (0.360) 2.89* 
Age Squared -0.028*** (0.005) -0.043*** (0.003)  7.25*** 
Farm Characteristics      
Total operated acres -10.780*** (0.002) -3.031*** (0.001) 19.63*** 
Total operated acres squared 0.0001*** (0.000) 0.00002*** (0.000) 22.21*** 
Entropy Index  -9.269 (7.560) 7.509 (4.701) 3.98*** 
Government payments  -12.712* (7.615) -6.406 (4.954) 0.52*** 
Dairy  -36.369*** (3.968) -8.510*** (2.613) 36.47*** 
Debt to Asset Ratio -3.899 (3.757) -4.680*** (1.748) 0.04*** 
Household net worth ($1,000) -0.002** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) 0.29 
Number of children -0.570 (0.943) -4.262*** (0.598) 11.59*** 
Regional Dummy Variables (Heartland region is the base category.) 
Northern Crescent -0.138 (2.861) 4.022** (1.818) 1.66 
Northern Great Plains -0.025 (5.015) 1.507 (2.815) 0.08 
Prairie Gateway 0.926 (3.485) -0.656 (2.074) 0.17 
Eastern Upland -0.632 (4.373) 3.123 (2.868) 0.58 
Southern Sea Board -10.828*** (2.986) -3.086* (1.848) 5.22** 
Fruitful Rim -11.442 (7.591) 7.187 (4.819) 4.66** 
Basin and Range -14.644 (9.803) 3.830 (4.949) 2.87* 
Mississippi Portal -18.095** (7.440) -16.856*** (4.599) 0.02 
County Level Variables      
Unemployment Rate -0.293 (0.601) -1.086*** (0.352) 1.39 
Metro 0.222 (1.721) -1.205 (1.089) 0.56 
2004 -1.096 (2.752) 5.116*** (1.718) 3.93** 
2005 3.140 (2.630) 8.927*** (1.604) 3.93** 
Intercept -53.266*** (18.012) -112.165*** (10.519)  
Number of Observations = 4,395 mq = 0.171 
Log Likelihood = -18,781.181 Likelihood Ratio Test of m = 0 
 Chi-2 (1)= 54.75*** 
1 
Chi-square statistics from the test that compares equality of coefficient estimates in the two equations.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
operators and their spouses.  Results in Table 2.3 show that the coefficient of the adoption intensity of 
GM crops is insignificant for operators whereas it is positive and significant for their spouses.17 The 
marginal effects estimates (Table 2.4) show that a unit increase in the adoption intensity of GM crops, i.e., 
                                                        
17 In order to check robustness of the results, we divided the sample into corn farmers and soybean farmers and 
applied the same model to the two subsamples. The results from the two models are quantitatively similar to the 
ones presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.4: McDonald and Moffitt Decomposition of Tobit Coefficients 
Variables 
Operators Spouses Rr	,]\ stu Rvtw  1 Rx	yt|yt{|Rvtw  2 Rr	,ed stu Rv}w   Rx	y}|y}{|Rv}w   
Share of GM Crop Acres  
in Total Crop Acres   0.333 9.831 
Personal Characteristics   
Years of formal education 0.014 0.407 0.059 1.751 
Age 0.018 0.533 0.047 1.376 
Age Squared 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 -0.017 
Farm Characteristics     
Total operated acres -0.082 -2.443 -0.041 -1.202 
Total operated acres squared 0.000 0.00002 0.000 0.000 
Entropy Index      
Government payments  -0.097 -2.880   
Dairy  -0.277 -8.241 -0.114 -3.375 
Debt to Asset Ratio   -0.063 -1.856 
Household net worth ($1,000) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
Number of children   -0.057 -1.690 
Regional Dummy Variables (Heartland region is the base category.) 
Northern Crescent   0.054 1.595 
Northern Great Plains     
Prairie Gateway     
Eastern Upland     
Southern Sea Board -0.082 -2.454 -0.041 -1.224 
Fruitful Rim     
Basin and Range     
Mississippi Portal -0.138 -4.100 -0.227 -6.685 
County Level Variables     
Unemployment Rate   -0.015 -0.431 
Metro     
2004   0.069 2.029 
2005   0.120 3.541 
Intercept -0.405 -4.100 -1.508 -44.484 
1. 
Rr	,]\ stu Rvtw = "	,]\ ~Yu  wst  
2. Rx	yt|yt{|Rvtw  =  1 − 	,]\ ~Yu  	,]\ stu r	,]\ stu  − 	,]\ stu r	,]\ stu b 
 
growing no GM crops at all to growing GM crops only, leads to an 33% increase in the probability of 
working off-farm for spouses. The same change increases the average weekly off-farm hours by 9.8 hours 
for spouses.   
These results are not fully consistent with a priori expectation that operators and spouses work 
longer off the farm due to the time savings made possible by the adoption of GM crops. The mixed results 
here may be attributed to the comparative advantages of operators and their spouses; operators are the 
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primary decision-makers of the farming operation and are likely to have more farming responsibilities 
relative to their spouses. As the farm adopts a time saving technology at a higher intensity, the spouse, 
who may have spent some time working on the farm, assisting operators with record keeping, seeking 
contracts, etc., may decide to leave such farming duties to the operator and switch to full-time or increase 
the number of hours working off the farm. From an economic perspective, this is plausible as long as the 
spouse has a higher opportunity cost of working on the farm than the operator does. 
For both operators and their spouses, personal characteristics obtained a significant coefficient 
with the expected sign (Table 2.3).  For operators, however, the marginal effects of such variables are 
much smaller than those for their spouses. For example, an additional year of education leads to only a 
1% increase in the probability of working off-farm and a 0.4 hours increase in the weekly off-farm 
working hours, while the analogous figures for their spouses are 6% and 1.8 hours (Table 2.4). The 
positive effect of education on off-farm labor supply is consistent with the human capital theory as well as 
empirical findings in literature (Goodwin and Mishra, 2004, Huffman, 1980, Huffman and Lange, 1989, 
Vergara, et al., 2004) 
Getting older by one year increases the probability of working off-farm for operators (spouses) by 
1.8% (4.6%) and the weekly off-farm working hours by 0.53 hours (1.32 hours). The positive impact of 
age, however, vanishes at around the age of 43 years old for operators and 40 years old for their spouses 
and becomes negative thereafter.18 In summary, younger operators and their spouses are more likely to 
work off-farm and work longer hours on average, which is in accordance with Sumner (1982). The 
significant chi-square statistics on education, age, and age squared (Table 2.3) indicate that the impacts of 
these variables on off-farm labor supply are significantly different between operators and their spouses.  
Large farms in terms of the total operated acres are less likely to work off-farm and work shorter 
hours.  The coefficient estimates as well as the marginal effects for the total operated acres are all 
negative and significant at 1% level for both operators and their spouses.  The negative relationship 
                                                        
18 Calculated as − c% B2 × c%}Cu , by taking the partial derivative of the dependent variable with respect to age 
and setting it equal to zero, where c%  and c%}  are the coefficient estimates in Table 2.3.  
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between farm size and off-farm labor supply are consistent with Fernandez-Cornejo (2007) and Nehring, 
et al. (2005). Unlike personal characteristics that exhibited stronger impacts on spouses’ labor 
participation, the negative relationship is stronger for their operators than for spouses conceivably because 
extra labor requirements on the additional acres fall more on operators, the primary decision maker. For 
operators, an increase in total operated acres by 1,000 leads to an 8.2% decrease in the probability of 
working off-farm and a 2.4 hour decrease in the weekly off-farm work hours. The corresponding figures 
for their spouses are about one half at 4.1% and 1.2 hours.  
Past studies (Howard and Swidinsky, 2000, Mishra and Goodwin, 1997) observed a negative 
relationship between receipt of government payments and off-farm labor participation. Our results 
support this relationship; for farms receiving government payments, operators are 9.7% less likely to 
work off-farm and, for those who do work off-farm, they work 2.88 fewer hours per week. We, however, 
do not observe a significant impact of government payments on their spouses’ off-farm labor supply, 
unlike the recent findings by El-Osta, et al. (2008) who found a negative correlation between government 
payments and off-farm labor supply by both operators and their spouses. 
Having a dairy enterprise is negatively correlated with off-farm labor supply in terms of both 
probability to work off-farm and off-farm work hours. This is consistent with the existing studies that 
labor intensive dairy operation and off-farm labor supply are negatively correlated (Fernandez-Cornejo, 
2007, Lass, et al., 1991, Sumner, 1982). Dairy farm operators are 27% less likely to work off-farm and, 
when they do work off-farm, they work 2.8 fewer hours per week than operators from non-dairy farms do, 
whereas their spouses are 33.8%  less likely to work off-farm and work 1.1 fewer hours per year relative 
to the non-dairy counterparts. 
Financial leverage of the farm business measured by debt to asset ratio has a negative coefficient 
for both operators and spouses, but it is only significant for spouses. We mentioned earlier that the sign of 
this variable is a priori ambiguous. The negative impacts appear to support one of the alternative views 
presented earlier that higher debt-to-asset ratio may be an indication of a commitment to farming as a 
consequence of large investments into the farm business. Presumably, those who are committed to farm 
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business, indicated by a high debt-to-asset ratio, prefer to manage risks on the farm rather than off the 
farm, and thus such farms are more likely to adopt GM crops that are yield increasing and cost reducing 
(Table 2.2). Household net worth has a negative and significant effect in both equations, but the impacts 
are economically insignificant. The presence of children under the age of 13 is found to have a negative 
and significant impact on off-farm labor supply of spouses. The results confirm the views that childcare 
negatively affects off-farm labor supply (Fernandez-Cornejo, et al., 2005, Kimhi and Lee, 1996). Because 
operators are predominantly male in the farm households, off-farm labor supply of spouses, most of 
whom are females, is more sensitive to the presence of young children in the family (El-Osta, et al., 2008, 
Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007, Furtan, et al., 1985, Huffman, 1980, Lass, et al., 1991). Our results confirm this 
view; the presence of an additional child younger than 13 years old in the household reduces the spouse’s 
probability of working off-farm by 5.7% and off-farm working hours by 1.69 hours per week (Table 2.4). 
Unlike the reduced form equation on the intensity of GM crop adoption (Table 2.2), regional 
dummy variables are mostly insignificant. What is instead significant is the county-level unemployment 
rate on spouses’ off-farm labor supply. A 1% increase in the unemployment reduces the probability of 
working off-farm by 1.5% and average weekly work hours by 0.43. Finally, dummy variables for 
observations made in 2004 and 2005 are positive and significant for spouses.  This is contrary to the 
increasing trend in off-farm labor supply in US farm sector, but the results should be interpreted with 
caution as they are based only on three-year observations. 
2.6. Conclusion and Summary 
The introduction of GM crop varieties in 1996 and the sharp increase in the adoption thereafter has 
dramatically changed the landscape of crop production in the United States.  The convenient features of 
GM crops, including higher expected yields, lower pesticide costs, and fewer labor requirements, stand in 
stark contrast to other management and capital intensive technologies.  An important question is how time 
savings made possible by the introduction of a convenient technology such as GM crops are reallocated 
by farm households. This study builds on the existing literature and expands the scope of analysis by 
measuring the adoption intensity of GM crops (corn and soybeans), and jointly estimating off-farm labor 
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supply decisions by farm operators and their spouses due to changes in the adoption intensity of GM 
crops.  
The econometric analysis demonstrated that the adoption intensity has no significant impact on 
off-farm labor supply by operators whereas it has a positive and significant impact on off-farm labor 
supply by their spouses.  Since farm operators are, by definition, the primary decision-makers of the farm 
operation, they are likely to have comparative advantages in farming relative to their spouses, who tend to 
have less farming experience. Therefore, it is plausible that time savings made possible by the adoption of 
GM crops allow each member of the household to pursue an activity at which he/she has a comparative 
advantage, allowing operators to remain on farm and their spouses to work more off the farm.  Marginal 
effects estimates showed that a unit increase in the adoption intensity of GM crops results in a 33% 
increase in the probability of working off-farm by their spouses.  For spouses who do work off-farm, the 
same change in the adoption intensity of GM crops adds 9.89 hours per week to the off-farm labor supply.   
The results also showed that the marginal effects of the explanatory variables have heterogeneous 
impacts on off-farm labor supply by operators and their spouses. While the variables related to farm 
operation influence operator’s off-farm labor supply more prominently, off-farm labor supply by their 
spouses is more sensitive to changes in the personal and household characteristics. Similar observations 
were made by Benjamin, et al. (1996), who estimated a joint model of labor decisions for farm 
households in France. These results suggest that both operators and spouses play different but 
complimentary roles in maximizing household utility, further supporting the view that the farm household 
assigns different roles to the operator and the spouse based on their comparative advantages.   
In concluding this chapter, we would like to note some of the limitations and caveats to this study. 
First, it is important to mention that diffusion of a new technology is a dynamic process (Rogers, 2003) 
and thus results from this study can only be applicable to the specific timeframe of the data analyzed. 
Studies using more recent data may provide a different picture of how farm households are adjusting their 
time allocation as they gain more experience with GM crop varieties. Secondly, different kinds of GM 
crops, i.e., herbicide tolerant, insect tolerant and stacked varieties, may have different implications on off-
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farm labor supply. Finally, it will be increasingly important to consider the prospect of crop failure as 
weeds and pests develop resistance to the herbicides and pesticides that are applied in greater frequency 
under GM crop production. It will be an exciting research topic for agricultural and labor economists to 
examine how the impact of a “convenient” technology on labor allocation decisions by farm households 
may change in a dynamic setting as the technology undergoes different stages of diffusion.  
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3.1. Introduction 
Technology adoption is an extensively studied topic in agricultural economics. A plethora of empirical 
literature has identified a wide range of factors that influence technology adoption decisions by farmers. 
Education is one of the most frequently used variables in empirical models conceivably due to the human 
capital theory (Becker, 1994). Existing research mostly reveals that education is positively correlated with 
technology adoption. In agriculture, farmers with higher education have better access to information and 
knowledge that are beneficial to the farming operation.  They also tend to possess a higher analytic 
capability to process the information and knowledge necessary to successfully implement new 
technologies and realize expected results.  Hence, higher education allows farmers to make an efficient 
adoption decision (Rahm and Huffman, 1984) and be the early adopters who can take advantage of new 
technologies to extract maximum profit (Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). Highly educated farmers also 
tend to adopt new technologies with a greater intensity (Saha, et al., 1994). 
 The present study reconsiders this conventional belief.  We hypothesize that the effect of 
education on technology adoption could be very heterogeneous and even be negative. Take the case of 
education and its impact on off-farm labor supply. Education increases farmers’ human capital and gives 
them more lucrative employment opportunities off the farm, which in turn decreases managerial time on 
the farm to implement new technologies. This is particularly true for management-intensive technology.   
Considering the facts that the number of college-educated farmers has been steadily increasing 
over the past five decades (Mishra, et al., 2009) and an increasing share of farm household income is 
derived from off-farm sources (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007), it is of interest to accurately assess the effect 
of education on technology adoption in the context of farm households’ labor allocation between on- and 
off-farm.  In so doing, we estimate an econometric model of technology adoption that accounts for the 
endogeneity of off-farm labor participation using the propensity score matching method proposed by 
Mayen, et al. (2010). The primary interest is the potentially heterogeneous impacts of education on 
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technology adoption contingent upon the farm household’s dependence on off-farm income. Therefore, 
particular attention is given to the interaction between education and the dependence on off-farm 
income—calculated as a share of off-farm income, excluding unearned income, in total household 
income—and its impact on technology adoption. It has been theorized that operators of small farms are 
more likely to work off-farm (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007) and less likely to adopt management-intensive 
technology (Saha, et al., 1994). This chapter examines the relationship between education, off-farm labor 
and two recent innovations in agriculture for a sample of crop producers in the United States, using data 
from the 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). 
The two technologies considered in this study are precision farming and genetically modified 
(GM) crops. Precision farming is designed to optimize input use in agricultural production by exploiting 
information about within-field variability of soil and crops gathered through a suite of technologies 
(Paxton et al., 2011). Genetically modified crop varieties possess traits that are not possible through 
traditional plant breeding, such as herbicide tolerance and insecticide resistance, to allow for flexible 
weed and pest management practices (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006). These technologies share 
similar characteristics in that they both offer an alternative to crop production. They also became 
commercially available around the same time.19 In contrast, precision farming requires a relatively large 
investment at the outset and is known for its management-intensive nature, while GM crops are easy to 
implement and considered management-saving (Smith, 2002). While GM crops became very popular 
shortly after their introduction (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006), the pace of adoption for precision 
farming has been modest (Banerjee, et al., 2008, McBride and Daberkow, 2003). The two contrasting 
technologies would allow us to improve the understanding about the relationship between education and 
technology adoption in contemporary US agriculture.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews existing literature on the 
relationship between education, technology adoption and off-farm labor supply in agriculture. Sections 
                                                        
19 Precision farming became commercially available in the early 1990’s (McBride and Daberkow, 2003) while GM 
crop varieties were commercially introduced in 1996 (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006). 
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3.3 and 3.4 provide a conceptual model and an empirical model, respectively. Section 3.5 describes data 
used in this study, followed by empirical results in Section 3.6. The final section offers concluding 
remarks. 
3.2. Literature Review 
In order to lay a comprehensive theoretical foundation about the effect of education on technology 
adoption, we attempt to unite findings from three different topics in the agricultural economics literature.  
We first review mixed empirical findings about the effect of education on technology adoption, followed 
by the effect of education on off-farm labor supply.  Finally, we shed light on recent studies that account 
for these two effects within a single model to explain the decision making process through which farmers 
allocate their time between off-farm and on-farm activities, including technology adoption.   
3.2.1. Education and Adoption 
In agriculture, human capital of farm operators can be represented in a number of different ways, with 
formal education and farming experience being two of the most commonly adopted measures.  Although 
farming experience can be the preferred measure in a static environment in which accumulated 
knowledge in farming operation or on-the-job training experiences do not depreciate or become obsolete 
(Huffman, 2001), formal education or schooling is widely considered to be the most important form of 
human capital (Becker, 1994). This is especially true in a dynamic political and economic environment 
where new technologies and information regularly become available (Huffman, 2001). In a more realistic 
setting, formal schooling will play a more prominent role than farming experience for farm operators to 
constantly update their knowledge and farming practices to stay competitive.   
  A number of empirical studies have shown the positive effect of education on the adoption of 
various types of technology in agriculture.  For example, education is found to have a positive impact on 
the adoption of forward pricing methods (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994), computer technologies 
(Huffman and Mercier, 1991, Putler and Zilberman, 1988) , the Internet (Mishra and Park, 2005, Mishra, 
et al., 2009), reduced tillage (Rahm and Huffman, 1984), recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) 
(Chang, et al., 2008), precision farming (Roberts, et al., 2004), genetically engineered corn (Fernandez-
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Cornejo, et al., 2001), soil nitrogen testing (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995), conservation practices (Traore, et al., 
1998) and the level of participation in government-supported conservation programs (Lambert, et al., 
2007), among others.   
  On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence of an insignificant or even a negative effect 
of education on technology adoption.  For instance, farmers’ education was found to have an insignificant 
effect on the adoption of the variable rate technology (Khanna, 2001) and GPS guidance system for 
cotton farmers (Banerjee, et al., 2008).  Nyaupane and Gillespie (2009) identified factors affecting the 
adoption of best management practices (BMP) for Louisiana crawfish producers, but education was found 
to be insignificant for the adoption of all but one BMP, of which education was found to be negatively 
correlated with the adoption.   
Gould et al. (1989) studied factors affecting adoption of conservation tillage for Wisconsin 
farmers.  They unexpectedly found that education is negatively correlated with adoption, holding constant 
other factors, such as the proportion of off-farm work time to on-farm work time, among others.  This 
implies that highly educated farmers are less likely to adopt conservation tillage, given the same 
proportion of off and on farm work time.  Because highly educated farmers are more likely to earn higher 
wages from off-farm work, they are expected to have a higher proportion of off-farm income to farm 
income given the same proportion of on and off farm work time, provided that the marginal value product 
of education is higher in off-farm work than on-farm. Therefore, it is plausible that highly educated 
farmers, who tend to be more reliant on off-farm income, have fewer incentives to spend time and effort 
on farming, including adoption of technologies such as conservation tillage.   
  As these examples show, the effect of education on technology adoption in empirical literature 
has yet to reach a consensus consistent with the economic theory.  Although the mixed empirical evidence 
might to some extent be explained by factors such as types and diffusion stages of the technology 
(Sunding and Zilberman, 2001), few attempts have been made to explore the underlying reasons for such 
incoherent findings, perhaps because the underlying theory seems intuitively too appealing to refute. 
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3.2.2. Education and Off Farm Labor Supply 
The inconsistent empirical results about the effect of education on technology adoption may also be 
attributed to the relationship between education and off-farm labor.  The recent trend of increasing off-
farm labor supply by US farm households can be explained by the relative increase in non-farm sector 
real wage and the decrease in demand for farm labor and family labor (housework) due to the 
development of labor-saving technologies (Huffman, 2001). In today’s economic environment 
surrounding the US agricultural sector, highly educated farmers have higher incentives to work more off 
the farm, ceteris paribus.  Farming becomes relatively less attractive as human capital accumulated and 
longer years of formal education becomes an advantage in finding more attractive off-farm employment 
opportunities.   
 Theoretically, however, the effect of education on off-farm labor supply is ambiguous; while 
higher education increases employment opportunities off the farm, farms with a highly educated operator 
may realize higher productivity in the farming operation and thus the reservation wage to work off-farm 
for such operators may be high (Huffman and Lange, 1989). The existing literature has mostly found that 
education is positively correlated with both off-farm labor participation and the intensity of off-farm work 
(Huffman, 1980, Huffman and Lange, 1989). Goodwin and Mishra (2004) found a strong and positive 
effect of education on off-farm labor participation. Huffman (1980) estimated the effect of education on 
the odds ratio of off-farm work participation and the number of days worked off-farm by farm operators.  
The study found a positive and significant effect of education on both the odds ratio and the number of 
days working off-farm by an operator. 
From a theoretical standpoint, there are two contrasting effects of education on technology 
adoption.  On one hand, higher education encourages technology adoption, but on the other hand, higher 
education increases off-farm labor supply, which inevitably affects on-farm labor supply and technology 
adoption. Although it is theoretically possible that increased off-farm labor income provides farmers with 
financial flexibility to implement a new technology, Wozniak (1993) concluded that the negative impact 
of reallocation of operators’ time away from farming on technology adoption seems to be more 
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significant than the financial flexibility due to off-farm income. The mixed findings about the effect of 
education on technology adoption in empirical literature can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the 
conventional technology adoption models do not always account for the positive impact of education on 
off-farm labor supply.   
3.2.3. Technology Adoption and Labor Allocation 
Although studies that have combined technology adoption and labor allocation into a single model had 
been largely nonexistent, recent exceptions are Fernandez-Cornejo, et al. (2005) and Fernandez-Cornejo 
(2007). The former explored the simultaneous process through which operators and spouses allocate their 
time between on and off farm work and its relation to adoption of herbicide tolerant (HT) soybean, a 
representative of a time-saving technology. The study found a positive correlation between education and 
off-farm work for operators but not for spouses. Also, the impact of education on adoption of HT 
soybeans was not statistically significant. The report by Fernandez-Cornejo (2007) employed a model 
similar to Fernandez-Cornejo, et al. (2005) but included adoption of yield monitors, which is required for 
precision agriculture, a representative of a management-intensive technology. The study confirmed a 
negative correlation between the adoption of yield monitor and off-farm income. However, the authors 
did not specifically discuss the role of education on the adoption of yield monitors. 
3.3. Conceptual Framework 
We employ the conventional agricultural household model (Fernandez-Cornejo, et al., 2005, Huffman and 
Lange, 1989, Huffman and Mercier, 1991, Lass, et al., 1989, Sumner, 1982) in which farm households are 
assumed to have a well-behaving utility function under three constraints: time, budget and production. 
The objective function to be maximized is given by  
   = 	
, , , (1) 
where 
 is a composite good the farm household purchases and consumes,  is a 2 × 1 vector where 
elements represent leisure time for the farm operator and the spouse, and  is a vector of factors that 
influence farm household utility exogenously. The time constraint, , can be represented as 
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 = I J =  0	3  	<  0	3  	<   = 0	3 + 	 + . (2) 
The matrix of the household time constraint, , consist of the operator’s and the spouse’s time constraints 
denoted as ,  and , respectively.  Both   and  are made up of three components: on-farm, off-
farm, and leisure hours, denoted by subscripts, “on,” “off,” and “L,” respectively. In light of the objective 
of this study, we explicitly specify that off-farm labor supply is a function of human capital, , and on-
farm labor supply is a function of technology adoption, , which is also dependent on human capital. 
Note that  is a 2 × 1 vector that represents the human capital of the operator and the spouse for th farm 
household and  is a 2 × 1 vector to account for the adoption of the two technologies considered in this 
study: precision farming and GM crops. 
  The budget constraint for the farm household is given by:  
 $%
 = $&' − )*′ ,0	3 + -′	 + ., (3) 
where $% is the price of the composite good, $& is the price of the farm output, ' is the quantity of the 
farm output produced, )* is a ! × 1 vector of farm input prices, , is a ! × 1 vector of farm inputs, - is a 2 × 1 vector of off-farm wage for the operator and the spouse, and . represents all other sources of 
income including government subsidies and interest payments. Note that $&' − )*′ ,0	3 represents 
the net farm income and the vector of input decisions, ,, is dependent on the adoption of the two 
technologies. What is implicitly assumed in equation (3) is that all household income will be spent on 
, 
which may include a variety of financial services such as savings and investments. The production 
constraint is given by:  
 ' = '0,	, 0	3, , 	, 23,   Γ ≥ 0 (4) 
where  is a  × 1 vector of exogenous variables relevant to agricultural production such as climatic and 
site-specific environmental conditions. Following Huffman (1991), the “farm technology – constrained 
measure of household net cash income” can be obtained by substituting equation (4) into equation (3): 
 $%
 = $&='0,	, 0	3, , , 23? − )*′ ,0	3 + -′	 + .. (5) 
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The Lagrangian function that incorporates the objective function and the constraints is given by 
 # = 	
, , Φ + A	$&'=,0Γ	<3, 0	3, , 	, 2? − )*′ ,0	3 
(6) 
 +-′	 + . − $%
 + D′ − 0	3 − 	 − . 
Some of the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are:  
 G#G
 = GG
 −  A$& = 0 (7) 
 G#G, =  A P$& IG'G,J − )*Q = 0$& IG'G,J = )*  (8) 
 G#G = A $& LIG'G,J+ IG,GJM+ + LI G'GJ+ IGG JM
+ + G'G − P)*+ IG,GJQ+ − PD′ IGG JQ+ ≤ 0G#G = A$& IG,GJ+ IG'G,J + A$& IGG J+ I G'GJ + A$& IG'GJ − A IG,GJ+ )* − IGG J+ D ≤ 0
 (9) 
 G#G = A P$& G'GQ − D ≤ 0P$& G'GQ ≤ DA
 (10) 
 G#G = A- − D ≤ 0- ≤ DA      and (11) 
 G#G = GG − D = 0GG = D
. (12) 
Equations (10), (11), and (12) state the conditions for the optimal allocation of time among the three 
activities. Equation (12) shows that the marginal utility of leisure is equal to the Lagrange multiplier on 
the time constraint, which is the shadow price of time. Both equations (10) and (11) have the ratio of the 
two Lagrange multipliers—the marginal rate of substitution between the net farm income and time. At the 
equilibrium, both off-farm wages and the marginal value product of on-farm labor need to be less than or 
equal to the marginal rate of substitution between net farm income and time. The inequality is maintained 
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in equations (10) and (11) to account for the possibility of corner solutions in which some operators and 
spouses may not work at all either on-farm or off-farm. On the other hand, equality is used in (12) 
because everyone is expected to have a positive amount of leisure time. Given these conditions, one can 
obtain the optimal level of off-farm labor supply, ∗ 	 by solving equation (2): 
 ∗ 	 = ∗ − =∗0	3 + ∗ ?. (13) 
Furthermore, the time-constrained intensity of technology adoption, , can be obtained by substituting 
equation (8) and equation (10) into equation (9): 
 G#G = A IG,GJ′ )* − A IG,GJ′ )* + A$& IG'GJ + IGG J′ D − IGG J D ≤ 0.  
Further simplifying,  
 $& P G'G	Q ≤ 0 (14) 
Equation (14) simply represents that, at the equilibrium, the marginal value product of technology 
adoption is zero if the technologies are adopted at a positive intensity and it is negative if the farm 
household opts not to adopt the technology at all. 
  Equations (13) and (14) represent the farm households’ decisions with respect to technology 
adoption and off-farm labor supply. Note that on the left hand side of both equations is a 2 × 1 vector 
instead of a scalar; equation (13) shows the optimal level of on-farm labor supply by both the farm 
operator and the spouse; equation (14) is the optimal level of adopting GM crops and precision farming 
practices. Additionally, it is explicitly shown in equations (13) and (14) that decisions regarding off-farm 
labor supply and technology adoption are contingent upon human capital by the operator and the spouse. 
3.4. Empirical Framework 
3.4.1. Bivariate Probit Model 
The econometric model we consider here consists of two equations: the adoption of precision farming and 
GM crops. Based on the general results in the previous section, we can express the technology adoption 
and labor allocation model as follows: 
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 yY = α y[ + ′o] + εY (15) 
 yb = β y[ + +oe + εb (16) 
where yY is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the farm adopts any type of precision farming technology 
and 0 otherwise,  y
2
 is also a dummy variable that takes 1 if the farm adopts any type of GM crops and 0 
otherwise. y[ is the farm households’ labor allocation decision. α and β are unknown parameters and  
and  are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated. o] and oe are vectors of exogenous variables. 
The error terms, ε1 and  εb are assumed to be normally distributed with zero means and correlated with 
each other at m. Equations (15) and (16) are estimated with a bivariate probit model.  
3.4.2. Propensity Score Matching  
An important econometric issue that arises in estimating a model such as the above is that of endogeneity. 
In the context of the model above, y[, the farm household’s labor allocation decision, could be 
endogenous. This chapter utilizes the propensity score matching approach proposed by Mayen, et al. 
(2010) to address the endogeneity issue. Although the propensity score matching method, originally 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is designed to estimate a treatment effect on a dependent 
variable attributable to treatment status,20 Mayen, et al. (2010) utilized the matching procedure as a sub-
sampling technique to address sample selection.21 
To implement the procedure, we categorize farms in the sample into two, full-time farms 
(treatment) and part-time farms (control). We define full-time farms as farms whose operator and spouse 
do not work off-farm, while part-time farms are defined as farms for which either operator or spouse (or 
                                                        
20
 Estimation of the “treatment effect” under non-experimental settings has recently become increasingly popular in 
social science research. There have been a number of reviews on theoretical background (Heckman et al., 1998; 
Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Morgan and Harding, 2006; Nichols, 2007 ) and practical applications 
(Abadie et al., 2004; Baser, 2006; Becker and Caliendo, 2007; Becker and Ichino, 2002; Nannicini, 2007) as well as 
some empirical applications in agricultural economics (Liu and Lynch, 2007; Mayen et al., 2010; Tauer, 2009). 
21
 In comparing technical efficiency of organic and conventional dairy farms in the United States, Mayen, et al. 
(2010) suspected and verified that acquisition of organic certification is endogenous. To rectify this, they estimated a 
probit model of propensity to be organic dairy farms and then utilized the predicted probability of being organic as a 
matching scheme to identify conventional dairy farms that share similar characteristics to organic dairy farms. See 
Mayen et al., (2010) for more details. 
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both) works off-farm. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the propensity score, which is a conditional 
probability of being in the treatment: 
 	H = $ 	 = 1|H =  = 	 = 1|H = , (17) 
where 	H in equation (17) can be obtained by a standard probit model. An important feature of the 
propensity score in equation (17) is that it summarizes information contained in -dimentional vector, H, 
into a single-index variable (Becker and Ichino, 2002). A testable assumption that needs to be satisfied in 
specifying the probit model is the balancing property:  
  ⊥ H| 	H (18) 
When equation (18) is satisfied, assignment to treatment is random for observations with the same 
propensity score (Becker and Ichino, 2002). The predicted probability from the probit model is used as a 
propensity score to match full-time farms with part-time farms that share similar characteristics. We use 
the nearest neighbor matching with three matches.22 The resulting sub-sample, to which we apply the 
bivariate probit model, will consists of all full-time farms and some part-time farms matched to full-time 
farms based on the propensity score.  
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the primary interest in this study is the interaction between 
education and the farm households’ dependence on off-farm income to evaluate the potentially 
heterogeneous impacts of education on technology adoption. We create two interaction terms: education 
and the dependence on off-farm income and education and the dependence on off-farm income squared. 
The latter is necessary to account for the potentially quadratic nature of the impact of education on 
technology adoption and the dependence on off-farm income. 
3.5. Data 
This study employs the 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data, developed by the 
Economic Research Service (ERS) and the National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS). The 2006 
ARMS collected information on farm households, income received from and time spent on off-farm work, 
                                                        




net cash income from operating another farm/ranch, net cash income from operating another business, and 
net income from share renting. The target population of the survey is operators associated with farm 
businesses representing agricultural production in the 48 contiguous states. A farm is defined as an 
establishment that sold or normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the 
year.  Farms can be organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, family corporations, non-family 
corporations, or cooperatives. Data are collected from one operator per farm, the senior farm operator. A 
senior farm operator is the operator who makes the majority of the day-to-day management decisions. For 
the purpose of this study, operator households organized as nonfamily corporations or cooperatives and 
farms run by hired managers were excluded.  
 The ARMS has a complex stratified and multi-frame design and each observation in the ARMS 
represents a number of similar farms, the particular number being the survey expansion factor (or the 
inverse of the probability of the surveyed farm being selected for surveying). The complex survey design 
as well as the cross-sectional nature of the data requires an appropriate technique to estimate standard 
errors to account for potential heteroskedasticity. Following the recent applications of the ARMS data in 
published studies (El-Osta, 2011, Mishra and El-Osta, 2008, Mishra, et al., 2010), standard errors are 
estimated using the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967, White, 1980). 
Considering the nature of the two technologies tied to crop production, farms not reporting crop 
sales are also excluded from the sample. That leaves us with 2,986 observations, of which 44% (1,324 
observations) is full-time farms. Table 3.1 provides the complete list of variables used in this study, their 
definitions and descriptive statistics. The second and third column in Table 3.1 presents the mean of the 
variables for full-time and part-time farms, respectively. The average share of off-farm income in total 
household income for full-time farms is very small but not exactly zero. This is because there are full-
time farms whose operator and spouse do not work off-farm, but other members in the household do. 
Note that, for most variables, the means are significantly different for full-time and part-time farms, 




Table 3.1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 






time Farms 1 
Mean 
Full-time Farms (=1 if both operator and spouse do 
NOT work off-farm) 
1.000 0.000 0.000 
Share of Off-farm Income in Total Household 
Income 2 
0.023 0.580*** 0.491*** 
 
Operator and Spouse Characteristics    
Operator's Years of formal education 13.341 13.894*** 13.473 
Operator's Age 58.922 52.240*** 58.701 
Spouse's Years of formal education 13.396 14.212*** 13.386 
Spouse's Age 56.504 49.727*** 56.300 
Farm Characteristics    
Log of Total Operated Acres 6.125 5.845*** 6.118 
Full Owners (=1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.303 0.293 0.316 
Full Tenant (=1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.133 0.140 0.079*** 
Part Owner (=1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.564 0.567 0.605** 
Debt to Asset Ratio = Total Liability/ Total Asset 0.134 0.151** 0.132 
Log of Household Net Worth 7.179 6.616*** 7.195 
Average Interest Rate for Loans 1.539 1.780*** 1.538 
Internet Access (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.738 0.833*** 0.756 
Dairy (=1 if dairy is primary enterprise, 0 
otherwise) 
0.075 0.045*** 0.076 
Number of Children Younger than 5 Years Old 0.145 0.184** 0.159 
Number of Children between 6 and 13 Years Old 0.270 0.329** 0.301 
Government Payments ($1,000)    
Direct Payments  28.661 19.549*** 28.535 
Indirect Payments  3.336 2.660 3.359 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Payments  0.892 0.967 0.995 
Working Land Conservation Program (WLCP) 
Payments  
1.661 0.963* 1.139 
Regional Dummy Variables (=1 if farm is located in respective region, 0 otherwise) 
Heartland 0.124 0.185*** 0.190*** 
Northern Crescent 0.168 0.164 0.177 
Northern Great Plains 0.033 0.059*** 0.037 
Prairie Gateway 0.101 0.116 0.099 
Eastern Upland 0.064 0.062 0.057 
Southern Sea Board 0.145 0.131 0.129 
Fruitful Rim 0.227 0.161*** 0.184*** 
Basin and Range 0.037 0.056** 0.052* 




Table 3.1 cont’d    








County Level Variables    
Unemployment Rate 5.195 4.838*** 5.195 
Population Interaction Zones in Agriculture 2000 
(ordinal, 1= lowest interaction, 4 = highest) 
1.737 1.614*** 1.747 
Amenity Index (ordinal, 1 = lowest, 7 = highest) 3.645 3.458*** 3.526** 
Soil Productivity Index 69.541 72.854*** 72.321*** 
Coefficient of Variation in Rainfall  0.080 0.084 0.088 
Average Rainfall 967.490 927.430*** 936.300** 
Number of Observations 1,324 1,652 1,014 
1 For every full-time farm, three part-time farms are matched based on the propensity score matching. Part-time 
farms can be matched multiple times. 
 
2 Calculated as total off-farm wage earned by operator, spouse, and all other family members divided by total 
household income. It is not necessarily zero for full-time farms if other family members earn off-farm income. 
 
***, **, and * indicate a significant difference from the mean for full-time farms at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
3.6. Results and Discussion 
To formally examine the presence of endogeneity, we first conduct the Smith-Blundell test (Smith and 
Blundell, 1986) using STATA command probexog, developed by Baum (1999). The test examines if the 
residuals from the reduced form equation obtains a significant coefficient in the probit model, with the 
null hypothesis that the residuals have no explanatory power in the probit model. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates endogeneity. We apply the test to equations (15) and (16) to examine the potential 
endogeneity of dependence on off-farm income using four external instruments: the number of children 
younger than five years old, the number of children between six and 13 years old, county-level average 
unemployment rates, and the Population Interaction Zones in Agriculture in 2000. These variables are 
assumed to have no impact on adoption of either precision farming or GM crops, but influence off-farm 
labor participation decisions by farm households. The chi-square statistics from Wald tests show that the 
dependence on off-farm income was endogenous to the adoption of GM crops, but not to the adoption of 
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precision farming.23 The rejection of the null hypothesis for the adoption of GM crops justifies the use of 
the propensity score matching to address the endogeneity. 
3.6.1. Propensity Score Matching  
Results from the probit model of the propensity to be a full-time farm are presented in Table 3.2. The list 
of variables used in the probit model satisfied the balancing property in equation (18). Several variables, 
mainly farm characteristics, obtained a significant coefficient. Highly educated spouses are less likely to 
work on farm. Farms with a lower average interest rate, higher debt to asset ratio, and higher household 
net worth are more likely to be full-time farms. Farm households with children younger than 13 years old 
are likely to work only on-farm, presumably due to the need for childcare. Farms receiving direct 
payments are less likely to work off-farm. A higher unemployment rate and population interactions at the 
county-level are discouraging factors for farm operators and spouses to work off-farm. 
 The predicted probability from the probit model is used as a propensity score to match full-time 
farms with part-time farms that share similar “propensity” to work full-time on farm. We employ the 
nearest neighbor matching with three matches.24 That is, for every full-time farm, three part-time farms 
with the closest propensity score are identified and kept in the sample. Note that the same part-time farms 
can be matched to full-time farms more than once, but all of the matched part-time farms are weighted 
equally, regardless of the number of times they are matched to full-time farms. The resulting sample 
consists of 1,324 full-time farms and 1,014 matched part-time farms (Table 3.1). The last column in Table 
3.1 shows means of the variables used in this study for the matched part-time farms. Some variables still 
exhibit a statistically significant difference in means between full-time and the matched part-time farms, 
such as full-tenant, part-owner, and the Heartland region. However, for most variables for which there is a 
significant difference in means between full-time and part-time farms (third column) the difference is now  
                                                        
23 For precision farming, the chi-square statistic is 0.85 (p-value = 0.652). For GM crops, it is 7.711 (p-value 
=0.021).  
24 The choice of the number of matches requires a trade-off. When the number of matches is one, each treated 
observation is matched with one observation in the control group with the closest propensity score, however, any 
unmatched observations in the control cannot be utilized in subsequent econometric analyses. When the number of 
matches is larger, more observations can be utilized, but the quality of match may have to be compromised. 
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Operator and Spouse Characteristics 
Operator's Age -0.054 0.034 
Operator's Age Squared 0.001 0.000* 
Operator's Formal Years of Education -0.026 0.016 
Spouse's Age -0.022 0.033 
Spouse 's Age Squared 0.001 0.000 
Spouse 's Formal Years of Education -0.133 0.017*** 
Farm Characteristics   
Log of Total Operated Acres -0.001 0.018 
Internet Access (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.033 0.070 
Average Interest Rate for Loans -0.066 0.016*** 
Debt to Asset Ratio = Total Liability/ Total Asset 1.159 0.186*** 
Log of Household Net Worth 0.295 0.027*** 
Dairy 0.208 0.113* 
Number of Children Younger than 5 Years Old 0.166 0.061*** 
Number of Children between 6 and 13 Years Old 0.134 0.041*** 
Government Payments ($1,000)   
Direct Payments  0.002 0.001*** 
Indirect Payments  -0.001 0.002 
Conservation Reserve Program Payments  -0.004 0.005 
Working Land Conservation Program Payments  0.005 0.003 
County-level Variables   
Unemployment Rate 0.081 0.014*** 
Population Interaction Zones in Agriculture 2000 0.092 0.029*** 
Intercept 0.273 0.593 
Number of Observations = 2,851 Likelihood Ratio Chi-2(20) = 662.04 
Log pseudo likelihood = -1622.224 Prob > F =0.000  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
insignificant. As a check, we conducted the Smith-Blundell test once again on this refined sample. The 
adoption of precision farming remains exogenous and the adoption of GM crops now becomes 
exogenous25 as well, indicating that the sub-sampling approach using the propensity score matching 
successfully addressed the endogeneity. 
3.6.2. Bivariate Probit Model on Technology Adoption 
Table 3.3 presents results from the bivariate probit model on the adoption of precision farming and GM 
crops, corresponding to equations (15) and (16). The second and third (fourth and fifth) columns show 
coefficient and marginal effect estimates of factors explaining adoption of precision farming (GM crops).                                                          
25 The chi-square statistic is 3.98 (p-value = 0.136) for precision farming and 2.183 (p-value =0.339) for GM crops. 
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Table 3.3: Factors Affecting Adoption of Precision Farming and GM Crops  
Variables 
Bivariate Probit Model 







Operator Characteristics       
Education 0.050*** 0.013 -0.053*** -0.018 17.05*** 
Education × Share of Off-farm 
Income 
-0.059** -0.015 0.099*** 0.034 15.59*** 
Education × Share of Off-farm 
Income Squared 
0.056* 0.014 -0.087*** -0.030 12.62*** 
Operator's Age 0.031 0.008 -0.032* -0.011 5.50** 
Operator's Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.67** 
Farm Characteristics      
Log of Total Operated Acres 0.049* 0.012 0.312*** 0.105 36.27*** 
Full Owners  -0.184** -0.046 -0.301*** -0.098 0.85 
Full Tenant  0.233** 0.064 -0.320*** -0.100 14.21*** 
Debt to Asset Ratio  0.761*** 0.195 -0.890*** -0.301 28.6*** 
Log of Household Net Worth 0.180*** 0.046 -0.145*** -0.049 38.67*** 
Average Interest Rate  0.024 0.006 0.042** 0.014 0.47 
Internet Access  0.273*** 0.065 -0.097 -0.033 9.88 
Dairy  -0.082 -0.020 0.759*** 0.287 17.91*** 
Government Payments ($1,000)      
Direct Payments  0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 5.21** 
Indirect Payments  -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.31 
CRP Payments  0.008 0.002 -0.015** -0.005 11.96 
WLCP Payments  0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.01 
Regional Dummy Variables (=1 if farm is located in respective region, 0 otherwise) 
Northern Crescent 0.014 0.004 -0.555*** -0.165 12.02*** 
Northern Great Plains -0.077 -0.019 -1.487*** -0.281 31.04*** 
Prairie Gateway -0.001 0.000 -1.039*** -0.253 29.22*** 
Eastern Upland 0.066 0.017 -0.766*** -0.201 16.57*** 
Southern Sea Board 0.332** 0.094 -0.275* -0.087 8.65*** 
Fruitful Rim 0.456*** 0.131 -1.447*** -0.345 55.66*** 
Basin and Range 0.064 0.017 -1.361*** -0.274 15.68*** 
Mississippi Portal -0.193 -0.045 -0.516*** -0.150 2.21 
County Level Variables      
Amenity Index  -0.029 -0.007 -0.250*** -0.084 10.36*** 
Soil Productivity Index 0.006** 0.002 0.010*** 0.004 1.07 
Coefficient of Variation in Rainfall  -0.805** -0.206 -0.465 -0.157 0.24 
Average Rainfall 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.09 
Intercept -4.457***  1.280*   
Number of Observations = 2,338 mq = 0. 127 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  = -2106.912 Likelihood Ratio Test of m = 0 
 Chi-2 (1)= 7.659*** 
1
 Compares coefficient estimates from two equations. 




The last column compares coefficient estimates across the two equations. A significant chi-square statistic 
indicates that the variable has different impacts on the adoption of the two technologies. The sample size 
of 2,338 represents all full-time farms and the matched part-time farms. The estimated correlation 
coefficient between the two error terms, mq, is statistically significant at 0.127 (p-value = 0.006), which 
validates the bivariate probit model instead of two separate probit models.  
 The primary interest of this study is the effect on technology adoption of education and the two 
interaction terms between education and the dependence on off-farm income. Coefficient estimates on the 
three variables are all statistically significant with expected signs, except that education has a negative 
coefficient in the GM crop equation. For the adoption of precision farming, education has a positive 
coefficient. This indicates that, for farms without off-farm income (so that both of the interaction terms 
become zero), education has a positive impact on the adoption of precision farming, which is consistent 
with the human capital theory and most empirical findings. For farms with no off-farm income, an 
additional year of education increases the probability of precision farming adoption by 0.013. On the 
other hand, education unexpectedly has a negative coefficient on the adoption of GM crops; an additional 
year of education decreases the probability of the adoption by 0.053. Several plausible explanations can 
be made for this unexpected result. First, highly educated farmers may be more aware of the controversy 
over GM crops, i.e., manipulation of gene structures in GM crops and its uncertain health effect, which 
may have discouraged them from adopting GM crops. Second, the rapid increase in the adoption of GM 
crops since 1996 may have induced educated farmers to seek a niche market by intentionally growing 
non-GM crop varieties, including organically grown crops. Third, due to the lower labor and human 
capital requirements, GM crops may have been well-accepted among relatively less educated farmers. 
Once we take into account the two interaction terms, however, the impact of education on 
technology adoption shows a very different picture. Figure 3.1 depicts a profile of the marginal effect of 
education on the adoption of precision farming and GM crops at different levels of off-farm income 
dependence, based on the point estimates of the marginal effects in Table 3.3. For precision farming, the 




Figure 3.1: Marginal Effect of Education on Technology Adoption 
 
significant (Table 3.3). As the dependence on off-farm income increases, the positive effect of education 
becomes smaller and smaller until the share of off-farm income in the total household income reaches 
around 53% after which the effect bounces back.26 As expected, due to the management-intensive nature 
of precision farming, the effect of education on the adoption becomes smaller as part-time farms become 
increasingly dependent on off-farm income. 
For GM crops, the effect of education is completely reversed; the first interaction term is positive 
and significant and the second interaction term is negative and significant. As part-time farms rely more 
on off-farm income, the negative effect of education mitigates, presumably because the time and 
management-saving nature of GM crops becomes more attractive for part-time farms that rely more on 
off-farm income, leaving less managerial time on-farm. Figure 3.1 shows that the marginal effect of 
education keeps increasing until the share of off-farm income reaches around 57%. Because the absolute 
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values of the marginal effects of the two interaction terms are larger for GM crops than for precision 
farming, the curvature of the marginal effect is steeper for GM crops than for precision farming (Figure 
3.1).  
In order to examine the robustness of the results, we estimated the same model with more 
parsimonious selections of explanatory variables. Results are summarized in Table 3.4. The first model 
(Model I) only includes the operator characteristics while the second model (Model II) also includes the 
farm characteristics. The third model (Model III) has the government-payment variables in addition to the 
operator and farm characteristics. In all of the three models, education and the two interaction terms are 
statistically significant and the sign of the coefficients in the two equations are exactly the same as in the 
full model presented in Table 3.3.27 The quadratic relationship between the impact of education on the 
adoption of the two technologies and the dependence on off-farm income appears robust to model 
specifications.  
Now we turn back to results in Table 3.3 to interpret the coefficients and the marginal effects of 
other explanatory variables. The farm characteristics are mostly significantly correlated with the adoption 
in both equations. The farm size in terms of the total operated acres has a positive impact on the adoption 
of both technologies, but its significance is more conspicuous for GM crops both statistically and 
economically. Full owners, farms who own all the acres they operate, are less likely to adopt both 
technologies while full tenants, farms who rent all the acres they operate, are more likely to adopt 
precision farming but less likely to adopt GM crops, relative to part owners who operate both owned and 
rented land. Out of the three variables representing the financial conditions of the farm business and 
household, farm debt to asset ratio and household net worth have a contrasting effect. Precision farming 
often requires a relatively large amount of initial investment and thus farms with a large household net 
worth (asset minus debts) and those farms that can take on a relatively large amount of farm debt are 
                                                        
27 We also estimated several different versions of the model. For example we estimated a model in which spouse 
characteristics (education, age, and age squared) are included, in addition to all the variables in the full-model in 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































favored to adopt precision farming.28 In contrast, farms households with a smaller net worth and farm 
business with a lower debt to asset ratio are more likely to adopt GM crops. The convenient feature of 
GM crops such as lower input costs and higher expected yields may prove attractive for farm businesses 
and households under relatively unstable financial conditions. The average interest rate on loans, holding 
constant of debt to asset ratio and household net worth, can represent an objective measure of financial 
risk in the lending market (Goodwin and Mishra, 2000). Those farms borrowing at a higher interest rate 
are more likely to adopt GM crops, conceivably due to the ease of implementation, higher expected yields, 
and immediate returns. With the information intensive nature of precision farming, farms with Internet 
access are more likely to adopt precision farming, while labor-intensive dairy farms are more likely to 
adopt GM crops.  
The positive and significant effect of direct payments on the adoption of GM crops suggests that 
agricultural subsidy is inducing technology adoption. A $10,000 increase in direct payments increases the 
probability of adopting GM crops by 2%. The significant marginal effect of government payments on GM 
crops can be attributed to the fact that farm program payments are tied to production of corn, soybean, 
cotton and other cash grain crops. Farm program payments may provide farmers with an additional source 
of income that can be used to purchase new technologies (Caswell, et al., 2001, Lambert, et al., 2006, 
Lambert, et al., 2007) 
Literature indicates that technology adoption is affected by the geographical location of the farm 
(Mishra, et al., 2009). Table 3.3 shows that all regional dummy variables are statistically significant for 
GM crops; however, only two of them are significant for precision farming. In the case of precision 
farming, farmers in the Southern Sea Board and the Fruitful Rim regions have a higher probability of 
adopting precision farming compared to farmers in the Heartland region (the base category). Presumably, 
the lack of regional impacts on precision farming adoption is because we control for soil productivity 
index. For GM crops, farmers in the Heartland region have a higher probability of adopting GM crops 
                                                        
28 Note that debt to asset ratio is a ratio of farm debt over farm asset while net worth is the difference between 
household asset minus household debt. 
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than those in any other region. Applicability of GM crops, especially insect-resistant crops, is dependent 
on the local environmental conditions (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006), and thus the regional 
dummy variables are more significantly correlated with the adoption of GM crops than precision farming.  
3.7 Summary and Conclusions  
While economic theory suggests that education has a positive effect on technology adoption by farmers, 
existing studies on technology adoption have yielded inconclusive results. We attribute this to the 
conventional technology adoption models that do not explicitly account for labor allocation decision 
between on- and off-farm, which is heavily influenced by human capital of farm operators and their 
spouses.  The purpose of this study was to fill the gap between the economic theory and the mixed 
empirical findings in agricultural economics on the impact of education on technology adoption. We 
employed the propensity score matching method to refine the sample to address the endogeneity of off-
farm labor participation. Using the two recent but contrasting innovations in agriculture, we estimated a 
bivariate probit model of technology adoption that allowed for interactions between education and the 
dependence on off-farm income.  
The results confirm our expectation that the effect of education on technology adoption is 
significantly contingent upon the dependence on off-farm income. Findings from this study suggest that 
the effect of education on adoption of a management-intensive technology such as precision farming can 
be much smaller for part-time farms that are more reliant upon off-farm income. Highly educated farms 
have more lucrative off-farm employment opportunities, which increases the opportunity cost of farming. 
As the dependence on off-farm income increases, the marginal effect of education on technology adoption 
for part-time farms becomes smaller. Part-time farms are less likely to adopt new technologies relative to 
equally educated full-time farms. For the adoption of GM crops, a representative of a management-saving 
technology, the effect of education was found negative, contrary to a priori expectations, but the effect 
became less negative as the reliance on off-farm income increased.  
  Given the increasing federal spending on agri-environmental programs that encourage farmers to 
adopt environmentally benign practices over the last two decades (Cattaneo, et al., 2005), a precise 
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assessment of the effect of education on technology adoption is necessary.  Our findings suggest that 
simply targeting highly educated farmers to promote new technologies on the basis of the conventional 
theory is not sufficient to achieve an efficient policy outcome. Of particular importance is the nature of 
the technology, i.e., management and labor requirements, and the farm household’s dependence on off-
farm income. With the increasing trend in off-farm labor participation among farm households in the 
United States (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007, Mishra, et al., 2009), the heterogeneous effects of education on 
technology adoption may become more prominent in the future.  
Finally, some limitations this study has encountered are noted.  First, the definition of precision 
farming in our data is more broadly defined than previous studies such as Banerjee, et al. (2008) and 
Roberts, et al. (2004).  This may have obscured the relationship between off-farm labor supply and the 
adoption of precision farming.  Second, our results showed that the marginal effect of education on the 
adoption of GM crops was negative. As mentioned earlier, this unexpected result could be attributed to 
the controversy over the genetically modified crops, especially for highly educated farmers, but further 
attention is warranted on this topic. Finally, it is necessary to apply the model used in this study to a 
different set of technologies to further confirm our proposition that the effect of education can be 
heterogeneous and even be negative, contingent upon the dependence on off-farm income. Future 
research will address these limitations to build on our early attempt to estimate the effect of education on 
technology adoption in the contemporary economic and social environment surrounding the US 
agricultural sector. 
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Risk and uncertainty have important implications to almost all economic decisions. It is essential that 
economists understand individual attitudes towards risk to accurately predict economic behaviors for 
successful public policy interventions (Dohmen, et al., 2005, Weber, 2010). Risk taking is often 
considered a distinctive characteristic among entrepreneurs (Block, et al., 2009, Caliendo, et al., 2009, 
Kamhon and Wei-Der, 2006). Since agricultural production is riskier than businesses in other sectors of 
the economy (Hardaker, et al., 2004), risk preferences should play a more pronounced role in explaining 
entrepreneurship and business decisions in the farm sector.  
The riskiness of agriculture may be attributed to several factors that are beyond the control of 
producers. The biological processes of plant growth and climatic conditions inherent in agricultural 
production cause random production shocks, which cause price volatility due to inelastic demand for 
foods (Goodwin and Mishra, 2000, Holt and Chavas, 2002). A large volume of literature has been 
devoted to risk analysis in agricultural economics.  The literature can be broadly classified into three 
categories: (1) how to measure farmers’ risk perceptions, (2) normative analysis to provide a guideline for 
the optimal risk management strategies, and (3) how risk preferences, assuming that they are properly 
measured, influence farmers’ actual decision-making (Holt and Chavas, 2002).  
This chapter belongs to the third category, with three objectives. The overriding theme of the 
chapter is to examine the validity of the measure of risk preferences using data from a nationwide survey 
of farm operators. It attempts to examine the validity of one of the simplest, but frequently used, measures 
of risk preferences: farmers’ own assessments of risk preferences measured on an 11-point Likert scale.29 
First, we identify the factors explaining farm operators’ risk preferences represented by Likert scale risk 
attitude. Next, we estimate a multivariate probit model to compare Likert scale risk attitude against three 
discrete variables representing actual realization of risk preferencess, revealed through off-farm labor 
                                                        
29 We call this variable “Likert scale risk attitude” hereafter. 
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participation, and use of contracts and crop insurance. Finally, we estimate a double-hurdle model to 
evaluate two different effects of risk preferences on adoption of a risk management strategy: whether or 
not a farmer adopts a risk management strategy and the intensity at which the farmer adopts the strategy. 
4.2. Literature Review 
Agricultural economists have relied on the expected utility framework as the basis of most empirical 
analysis of risk in agriculture (Holt and Chavas, 2002). The expected utility framework is a theoretical 
scheme derived based on the set of axioms developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Because 
of its normative nature, the validity of the expected utility theory needs to be confirmed empirically (Hey, 
1979). In fact, an increasing amount of empirical and experimental evidence has been accumulated to 
document the violations of the axioms in the expected utility theory (Machina, 1987, Starmer, 2000). 
Although the theoretical expectations of the expected utility theory often contradict the empirical 
evidence, it remains by far the most popular theoretical framework in agricultural economics due to its 
simplicity and the lack of better alternatives (Just and Peterson, 2010).  
The central difficulty in these studies is how to measure individual risk preferences. A wide 
variety of methods have been proposed to measure farmers’ risk preferences, but any proposed method is 
never free from contradiction with the empirical evidence, which are also subject to inconsistent findings 
within itself (Lagerkvist, 2005). For example, Fausti and Gillespie (2006) examined consistency across 
five risk-attitude measurement instruments. Not only did the authors find no consistency across different 
risk-attitude measurement instruments, they also found no significant relationship between levels of 
understanding of the survey questions by respondents and their consistency across risk-attitude 
measurement instruments. Their study suggests that the inconsistency cannot solely be attributed to the 
respondents’ understanding of survey questions or lack thereof.  Bard and Barry (2001) employed the 
“closing-in” method to elicit Illinois farmers’ risk preferences. The “closing-in” method is an iterative 
procedure in which respondents are repeatedly asked to choose between gambles until their preferences 
converges to a narrow interval.  The authors compared “closing-in” risk preferences against farmers’ own 
assessments of risk preferences measured on an 11-point Likert scale; however, the authors found no 
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correlation between them. The lack of consistency across risk-attitude measurement instruments is 
disturbing not only to economists who propose them, but also to those who need to rely on them for 
empirical analyses. 
The measurement of risk preferences used in this study is qualitative and does not explicitly 
utilize the expected utility theory. Specifically, the respondents were asked to choose a number between 0 
and 10 on a Likert scale to represent the level of risk at which they are comfortable in making decisions, 
with 0 being “avoid risks as much as possible” and 10 being “take risks as much as possible.” Economists 
are often skeptical about the validity of self-reported risk preferences such as this one for several reasons. 
First, this method, as well as any survey questions, is not incentive compatible. An incentive compatible 
measure of risk preferences obtained in an experimental setting is more suitable (Dohmen, et al., 2011). 
Second, the situational context of the question is broad and ambiguous. Therefore, responses may be 
based on a mix of factors, most notably risk preferences and risk perceptions, unobservable to researchers 
(Dohmen, et al., 2011). Responses may be obscured given that individuals often exhibit inconsistent risk 
preferences under alternative risky situations (Fausti and Gillespie, 2006).  
In contrast, there are some advantages to using a self-reported risk preferences, including Likert 
scale risk attitude. Unlike an experimental method, Likert scale risk attitude can be obtained in a mail 
survey, which makes it possible to conduct a large scale-study at a relatively affordable cost (Dohmen, et 
al., 2011). Another important benefit is the ease of understanding the question. Fausti and Gillespie (2006, 
2000) reported that a non-negligible share of the respondents demonstrated difficulty in understanding 
questions to elicit risk preferences in their survey. They also contended that respondents may not have 
paid sufficient attention while answering the questions. Using a very simple question format, as in Likert 
scale risk attitude, is recommended to the extent that these concerns are relevant (Fausti and Gillespie, 
2006).  
There is an absence of empirical evidence in agricultural economics that Likert scale risk attitude 
can obtain theoretically consistent findings. However, the same is not the case in other branches of 
economics. Dohmen, et al. (2011) conducted a field experiment with 450 randomly selected adults in 
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Germany and confirmed that Likert scale risk attitude was a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. 
Although risk preferences measurements catering to a specific situational context always outperformed 
other measures in that context, Likert scale risk attitude was the best all-round predictor of risk behaviors 
in all contexts (traffic offenses, portfolio choice, smoking, and occupational choice) than other measures 
constructed from lottery questions (Dohmen, et al., 2011). The findings in this study have significant 
implications for risk research in agricultural economics in which researchers often rely on lottery 
questions to ask respondents to choose between a given monetary award for certain and a chance to win a 
larger monetary award with a given probability less than one. Dohmen, et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
such questions will be a good predictor of risky behaviors under circumstances such as gambling, but not 
necessarily of others. Likert scale risk attitude is found to be the most consistent predictor of risky 
behaviors under various circumstances and can be used as a global assessment of individual risk 
preferences (Dohmen, et al., 2011).  
The findings in Dohmen, et al. (2011) are supported by several other empirical studies. For 
example, in a study to estimate individuals’ migration propensity in Germany, Jaeger, et al. (2010) used 
the same 11-point Likert scale risk attitude and found that risk-loving individuals are more likely to 
migrate. Caliendo, et al. (2009) also utilized the 11-point Likert scale risk attitude and observed that self-
employed persons are more risk-loving than others when they became self-employed out of 
unemployment in Germany30. Block, et al. (2009), using a 7-point Likert scale risk attitude, showed that 
entrepreneurs who started their ventures with identified business opportunities are more tolerant to risk 
than those entrepreneurs who started ventures out of necessity to earn a living.  
To summarize the discussion so far, there is ample evidence in labor economics and 
entrepreneurship literature to confirm the validity of Likert scale risk attitude, while no such evidence 
exists in agricultural economics. Although this study does not directly compare Likert scale risk attitude 
with other risk preferences measurements as in Bard and Barry (2001) and Fausti and Gillespie (2006), 
                                                        
30 The geographical scope of these studies is Germany because they all rely on the German version of the census 
data that contains questions to elicit respondents’ risk attitude on a 11-point Likert scale. 
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we estimate three econometric models and attempt to empirically examine if Likert scale risk attitude 
obtains coefficients with theoretically expected signs. 
4.3. Econometric Framework 
4.3.1. Ordered Logit Model 
With an ordinal structure of Likert scale risk attitude, we estimate an ordered logit model to identify the 
factors associated with risk preferences. The ordered logit model (also known as cumulative logit models 
for ordinal responses) takes a natural log of cumulative odds of the dependent variable that has an ordinal 
structure.  That is,  
 log P $	¡ ≤ ¢1 − $	¡ ≤ ¢Q = log £ ¤ ¥¦¦¦§Y¤ ¥¦¦̈§¦©Y ª , ¢ = 1, ⋯ , ¬, (1) 
where ¡ is an ordinal dependent variable with ¬ categories, ¥¦ is the probability that ¡ is categorized in 
the ¢th category (Agresti, 2007). In this study, ¬ = 11, as farmers’ risk preferences is measured on an 11-
point Likert scale.  The first category is used as a base category and all of the interpretations that follow 
are relative to the base category.  Equation (1) represents the log of odds: the ratio of the probability that, 
¡, th farmer’s risk attitude, is classified into ¢th or lower categories to the probability that ¡ is classified 
into ¢ + 1st or higher categories.  This log of odds is regressed against a set of explanatory variables, that 
is,   
 log P $	¡ ≤ ¢1 − $	¡ ≤ ¢Q = ­+D + ^, (2) 
where ­ is a vector of explanatory variables and D is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.  
An important econometric issue that arises in estimating the model using Likert scale risk attitude 
as a dependent variable is that of endogeneity. In many cases, it may be more reasonable to assume that 
risk attitude is exogenous to farm business decisions. Therefore, drawing causal interpretation based on 
the results from the ordered logit model may be inadvisable (Dohmen, et al., 2011) and readers should be 
warned that the results only helps us to understand the association between Likert risk preferences and the 
explanatory variables.  
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4.3.2. Multivariate Probit Model 
To estimate the impact of risk preferences on actual realization of risk preferences revealed through use of 
contracts and crop insurance and off-farm labor participation, we estimate a multivariate probit model. 
This approach is superior to individually estimating three probit models whenever the error terms in the 
respective models are correlated to each other. This is a legitimate concern in this study as there exists 
many risk management strategies in agriculture and some tools may be complements to or substitutes for 
others.  The multivariate probit model allows us to test if the error terms in the three equations are 
significantly correlated with each other. Likert scale risk attitude serves as an exogenous variable in each 
of the three equations.   
We assume that a farmer adopts a risk management tool if it increases his/her utility. Following 
notations in Walton, et al. (2008), we can express the farmer’s risk management problem as:  
 ∗ = ®¯ − °® (3) 
                                 ∗ = ,+± + ² , ∀  = 1, ⋯ , 5, (4) 
where ∗ is the net utility from adopting th risk management tool,  ®¯ is utility from adopting th risk 
management tool, °® is utility from not adopting th risk management tool, , is the vector of the 
exogenous variables that influences ∗, ± is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and ² is 
the error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. ² and ²¦ are assumed to be correlated 
with m¦  ∀  ≠ ¢. Note that ∗ is a latent variable that is unobservable to the researcher; what is 
observable instead is a discrete decision of whether the farmer adopts a risk management strategy or not, 
expressed as:  
 X =  1 if ∗ > 00 otherwise¼  ∀  = 1, ⋯ , 5. (5) 
Since we have three dependent variables with two outcomes, there are 2[ = 8 possible states of the world. 
For example, the probability that the farmer adopts all of the three risk management strategies or ¤ X = 3 
can be obtained by repeatedly applying the conditional probability theorem (Amemiya, 1994):  
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 Pr0XY = 1, Xb = 1, X[ = 1, 3 = Pr0XY = 1| Xb = 1, X[ = 13 × Pr 0Xb = 1, X[ = 13 (6) 
where the second term on the right hand side of equation (6) can be further rearranged as  
 Pr0Xb = 1, X[ = 1, 3 = Pr0Xb = 1|  X[ = 13 × Pr 0X[ = 13, (7) 
and so on to eventually obtain 
 
Pr0XY = 1, Xb = 1, X[ = 1 3 = $0XY = 1| Xb = 1, X[ = 13 × Pr0Xb = 1|  X[ = 13 × Pr 0X[ = 13 (8) 
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (8), we obtain 
 
Pr0XY = 1, Xb = 1, X[ = 1 3 = Pr 0,Y+ ±Y < ^Y| ,b+ ±b < ^b, ,[+ ±[ < ^[, 3 × Pr 0,b+ ±b < ^b| ,[+ ±[3 × Pr0 ,[+ ±[ < ^[3. (9) 
Similarly one can obtain the other seven states of the world. As apparent in equation (9), 
estimation of the multivariate probit model requires intensive calculation of multivariate standard normal 
distribution. The standard method is simulation-based approaches instead of algorithms based on standard 
linear numerical approximation (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). The Geweke Hajivassiliou Keane (GHK) 
smooth recursive conditioning simulator is the most popular simulator as it possesses a number of 
desirable properties, such as unbiasedness of the simulated probabilities, and the simulator is continuous 
and differentiable in the parameters of interest (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). Although these desirable 
properties are asymptotic, finite sample bias can be reduced to negligible levels when the number of draw 
is set close to the square root of the sample size (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). 
4.3.3. Double-hurdle Model 
Although it is a common approach, the drawback of probit models is the loss of information. In particular, 
a binary variable does not capture the intensity at which a farmer adopts the risk management strategies 
after he/she decides to adopt it. To address this issue, we construct a variable representing the share of 
farm income under contracts in total value of production as a proxy for the intensity at which farmers use 
contracts. Of the three dependent variables used in the multivariate probit model, use of contracts was 
chosen to create an intensity measure based on data availability. The choice of the dependent variable 
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here bodes well, as the literature suggests that factors affecting whether or not to adopt contracts are 
different from those affecting the quantity and frequency of contract use (Katchova and Miranda, 2004). 
A classic approach to incorporating the intensity measure would be a Tobit model due to James Tobin 
(1958). The Tobit model, however, assumes that the same underlying process determines both the 
probability that the dependent variable is censored and the conditional expectation of the dependent 
variable given that it is not censored (Burke, 2009). In the context of this study, The Tobit model assumes 
that the same underlying process determines whether a farmer uses contracts or not and the intensity at 
which the farmer uses them given that he/she decides to adopt it. As a consequence, the marginal effect of 
a regressor on these two outcomes always obtain the same sign (Wooldridge, 2001). This simplifying 
assumption is of concern in the current context in which we would like to allow for two different effects 
of risk preferences on whether a farmer adopts agricultural contracts or not and the intensity at which the 
farmer adopts the contracts. Cragg (1971) proposed a more flexible double-hurdle model in which these 
two outcomes are determined by separate processes. The double-hurdle model is also more flexible than 
Heckman’s two stage model (Heckman, 1979) as it allows for possibility of zero observations in both of 
the two outcomes (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Wooldridge, 2001).  
Since the double-hurdle model employs two separate processes to determine two outcomes, the 
model has two latent variables. Following notations in Mishra, et al. (2009) and Blundell and Meghir 
(1987) and suppressing subscript for individual observations,  
 XY∗ = ,]±] + ^Y (9) 
 Xb∗ = ,e±e + ^b, (10) 
where XY∗ is the latent variable representing the decision of whether or not to use agricultural contracts 
(Tier 1), Xb∗ is the other latent variable representing the intensity at which agricultural contracts are used 
(Tier 2). , and ± are, respectively, the vectors of independent variables and parameters to be estimated 
and ^Y and ^b are the error term. Note that subscripts, 1 and 2, for , and ± indicate that the two latent 
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variables can be specified by different sets of independent variables and error terms. The double-hurdle 
model obtains consistent estimates of ±] and ±e by maximizing the following likelihood function: 
 "	XY, Xb|,], ,e = 01 − Φ	,]±]3	YÁyt ÂΦ	,]±]	2¥ÁYb~ÁY exp0−	Xb − ,e±eb3Φ I,e±e~ J Å
yt , (11) 
where XY is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when XY∗ > 0 and Φ is the standard normal 
cumulative density function (Burke, 2009). We also estimate two marginal effects. One is the impact of a 
unit change in an explanatory variable on the probability that Xb is observed, or in the context of this 
model, the probability that the farmer uses contracts: 
 GPr 	Xb > 0|,]G¦ = cY¦Æ	,]±]. (12) 
The other is the impact of a unit change in an explanatory variable on the dependent variable given that it 
is not censored, or, in the given context, the marginal effect on the intensity at which contracts are used 
for those who use contracts: 
 GE 	Xb|Xb > 0; ,eG¦ = cb¦ 1 − A I,e±~ J P,e±~ + A I,e±~ JQ. (13) 
The standard errors for the two marginal effects are estimated following the bootstrap procedures with 
2,000 replications as recommended by Burke (2009). 
4.4. Data 
This study uses data from the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) conducted by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and the Economic Research Service (ERS). An important 
feature of the 2001 ARMS, particularly relevant to this study, is that it contains a question that queries the 
respondents’ risk preferences that is very similar to the one used by Dohmen, et al. (2011). Specifically, 
the respondents were asked to choose a number between 0 and 10 on a Likert scale to represent the level 
of risk at which they are comfortable in making decisions, with 0 being “avoid risks as much as possible” 
and 10 being “take risks as much as possible.”  In this study, we compare this variable, which can be seen 
as perceptions about their own risk preferences, against variables representing actual realization of their 
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risk preferences revealed by decisions they make in farming operation, which are also obtained from 2001 
ARMS data.  Figure 4.1 presents the histogram of Likert Risk preferences measured on a 11-point Likert 
scale.  A huge spike in the middle of distribution (Figure 4.1) shows that the majority of respondents 
chose 5 at the center of the Likert scale, indicating that most farmers consider themselves as neither risk 
taking or risk averse.  However, this does not necessarily mean that those who chose 5 are risk neutral in 
terms of curvature of utility function, as there is no theoretical connection between this question and 
respondents’ utility function. 
 
Figure 4.1: Risk Attitude Measured on an 11-point Likert Scale 
The ARMS provides information about the relationships between agricultural production, 
resources, and the environment as well as about the characteristics and financial conditions of farm 
households, management strategies and off-farm income. Operators associated with farm businesses 
representing agricultural production in the 48 contiguous states make up the target population of the 
survey. Data are collected from the senior farm operator, who makes most of the day-to-day management 
decisions. For statistical purposes, USDA currently defines a farm as an establishment that sold or 
normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the year (USDA 2005). For the 
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purpose of this study, our sample only includes farms that are classified as family farms that are organized 
as sole proprietorships, partnerships, or family corporations because they are closely controlled by their 
operators and the operator’s household (USDA 2005). Any operator households organized as nonfamily 
corporations or cooperatives and farms run by hired managers are excluded from this study because we 
are interested in farm business decisions made by individual farmers and his/her families not by hired 
managers. Also, any observations with missing values are deleted, which leaves us with 5,162 
observations.  
Definitions of variables used in this chapter and their summary statistics are provided in Table 4.1. 
It presents conditional means for observations with Likert scale risk attitude less than five, equal to five, 
and greater than five. A significant F-statistic for one-way ANOVA or Pearson chi-square statistics in the 
last column indicates that the conditional means for the three groups are different from each other. Most 
variables, except for most regional dummy variables, have a significant F or chi-square statistic, 
indicating some correlation between Likert scale risk attitude and independent variables, although it does 
not control for any confounding factors. Notably, a higher proportion of farmers who chose less than five  
on Likert scale risk attitude are part-time farmers (work off-farm as a primary occupation), less likely to 
be raised on farm, less educated, younger, and female. Those who chose more than five tend to operate a 
farm with more acres with diversified crop mix, measured by the entropy index. Such farmers are also 
more likely to have expanded acreage, participated in more farm programs, and accumulated more debts 
during the five years previous to the survey year of 2001. Calculating rate of return and preparing income 
and net worth statements also appear to be positively correlated with Likert scale risk attitude. 
4.5. Results and Discussion 
4.5.1. Ordered Logit Model 
Factors associated with individual risk preferences are identified by the ordered logit models. Table 4.2 
presents odds ratio and standard error estimates. Following Dohmen, et al. (2011), three versions of the 
ordered logit models are estimated. The first version consists of only operator characteristics, while the 
second version includes both operator and farm characteristics. The third model is added to assess the  
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Table 4.1: Variable Definitions and Comparison of Summary Statistics by Risk Categories 
Variable Definition Likert Risk Attitude 
F/chi statistics1 < 5 = 5 > 5 
Risk Attitude (Measured on 11-point Likert scale) 2.380 5.000 7.549 
Contracts (=1 if used either marketing or production 
contracts, 0 otherwise) 
0.231 0.302 0.395 116.623 *** 
Farm Income Under Contracts/ Total Value of 
Production 
0.169 0.214 0.268 32.540 *** 
Operator Characteristics 
Primary Occupation (=1 if off-farm, 0 if farm) 0.414 0.300 0.227 151.959 *** 
Raised on Farm (=1 if Yes, 0 No) 0.799 0.829 0.836 9.553 *** 
Years of formal education 13.212 13.342 13.723 27.820 *** 
Age 56.530 54.661 51.089 88.090 *** 
Race (=1 if Non-White race, 0 if otherwise) 0.070 0.058 0.062 1.998 
Gender (=1 if female, 0 if male) 0.082 0.047 0.033 46.788 *** 
Number of children (13 years old or younger)  0.378 0.446 0.578 20.590 *** 
Farm Characteristics 
Total operated acres (in 1,000) 1.002 1.355 1.820 8.540 *** 
Certified organic farm (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.010 0.011 0.015 2.341 
Debt to Asset Ratio 0.114 0.218 0.208 4.430 ** 
Entropy Index (continuous, 0 not diversified at all, 1 
completely diversified) 
0.015 0.021 0.026 23.450 *** 
Soil Productivity Index (County-level Mean) 71.636 71.736 72.093 0.560 
Full owner (=1 if full owner, 0 otherwise) 0.500 0.375 0.302 151.845 *** 
Tenant (=1 if tenant, 0 otherwise) 0.094 0.128 0.146 23.358 *** 
Part owner (=1 if part owner, 0 otherwise) 0.406 0.498 0.552 78.227 *** 
High Value Crop Farms (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.089 0.110 0.128 14.325 *** 
Livestock Farms (excluding Dairy) (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.503 0.429 0.383 53.897 *** 
Operate More Acres than in 1996 (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.239 0.311 0.415 122.789 *** 
Participate Farm Programs more than in 1996 (if yes, 0 
otherwise) 
0.135 0.159 0.221 47.114 *** 
Have More Debt than in 1996  (if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.213 0.289 0.438 207.197 *** 
Rate of Return (=1 if calculated, 0 otherwise) 0.245 0.338 0.460 197.722 *** 
Statement (=1 if Farm keeps income and net worth 




Table 4.1 cont’d 
Variable Definition Likert Risk Attitude F/chi statistics1 
= 5 < 5 = 5 < 5 
Regional Dummy Variables (=1 if farm is located in respective region, 0 otherwise) 
Heartland  0.127 0.132 0.139 1.254 
Northern Crescent 0.129 0.127 0.127 0.020 
Northern Great Plains 0.054 0.058 0.085 16.297 *** 
Prairie Gateway 0.115 0.130 0.111 3.042 
Eastern Upland 0.173 0.120 0.100 44.707 *** 
Southern Sea Board 0.137 0.139 0.137 0.029 
Fruitful Rim 0.131 0.154 0.156 5.220 * 
Basin and Range 0.045 0.043 0.052 1.827 
Mississippi Portal 0.089 0.097 0.092 0.520 
Number of Observations 1,735 1,489 1,938 
*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
1For continuous variables, ANOVA F-statistics is presented. For discrete variables, Pearson chi-square statistics 
is used.  
 
effect of geographical locations of farms.31 Comparison of the results across the three versions highlights 
the importance of operator characteristics in explaining individual risk preferences. The only exception is 
age, which is significant in the second and third models, but not in the first. Gender effects are significant. 
Not only are female operators more risk averse, the presence of children younger than 13 years old in the 
household makes female operators even more risk averse, while no such effect exists for male operators.  
Farm characteristics also have very consistent results in the second and third models. Farmers who 
operate more acres are more likely to take risks, and those operators who farmed more acres in 2001 than 
in 1996 are also associated with risk taking. Although causal interpretations are not advisable, having 
taken more debt in the previous five years is positively correlated with risk taking. Two variables 
representing business management activities also have odds ratios greater than one. In both the second 
and third models, farm operators who calculates rate of return to the farm business and prepares income 
and net worth statements are associated with a higher score on the Likert risk question. Along with the  
                                                        
31 An important assumption in the ordered logit model is that of the parallel regression assumption, which is 
frequently violated (Long and Freese, 2006). The Brant test rejects the parallel regression assumption. Therefore, we 
also estimated the same models using interval regression and ordered probit models as in Dohmen et al. (2011). 
Statistical and economic significance of the results are very similar to those in the ordered logit models. 
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Table 4.2: Factors Explaining Individual Risk Preferences 
Variables 
Ordered Logit Model on Likert Scale Risk Attitude 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Operator Characteristics Odds Ratio (Std. Err) 
Primary Occupation  1.963*** (0.111) 1.495*** (0.096) 1.480*** (0.095) 
Raised on Farm 1.096    (0.077) 1.054 (0.079) 1.055 (0.079) 
Years of formal education 1.079*** (0.013) 1.040*** (0.013) 1.038*** (0.013) 
Age 1.021 (0.014) 1.032** (0.016) 1.031* (0.016) 
Age Squared 1.000*** (0.000) 1.000*** (0.000) 1.000*** (0.000) 
Race  1.043 (0.116) 1.050 (0.122) 1.032 (0.121) 
Gender  0.638*** (0.079) 0.735*** (0.095) 0.731** (0.095) 
Number of children 0.997 (0.029) 0.981 (0.031) 0.982 (0.031) 
Number of children × Gender 0.603*** (0.075) 0.642*** (0.119) 0.646** (0.119) 
Farm Characteristics 
Total operated acres   1.036*** (0.012) 1.037*** (0.013) 
Total operated acres squared   1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
Certified organic farm   1.360 (0.367) 1.356 (0.366) 
Operate More Acres than in 1996    1.166** (0.070) 1.166** (0.070) 
Participate Farm Programs more than 
in 1996 
  
1.026 (0.073) 1.026 (0.073) 
Have More Debt than in 1996    1.547*** (0.094) 1.559*** (0.095) 
Rate of Return   1.116*** (0.027) 1.115*** (0.027) 
Statement    1.437*** (0.085) 1.445*** (0.087) 
High Value Crop Farms    1.373*** (0.122) 1.333*** (0.129) 
Livestock Farms (excluding Dairy)    0.976 (0.055) 0.952 (0.056) 
Regional Dummy Variables 
Northern Crescent     0.981 (0.092) 
Northern Great Plains     1.036 (0.118) 
Prairie Gateway     1.009 (0.099) 
Eastern Upland     1.035 (0.108) 
Southern Sea Board     1.202* (0.119) 
Fruitful Rim     1.108 (0.110) 
Basin and Range     1.063 (0.156) 
Mississippi Portal     1.017 (0.108) 
Number of Observations 5,162 4,861 4,861 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%,  and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
positive relationship between operator’s years of formal education and risk preferences, the results here 
speak to the important relationship between risk preferences and information. It is plausible that farmers 
who are more willing and capable of collecting information are able to make more informed decisions, 
possibly allowing them to take on riskier business enterprises. The results here, however, shed light on a 
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potential drawback of using Likert scale risk attitude. Ideally, risk preference should be measured where 
respondents share the same perception about a risky event. Because the Likert risk question in the 2001 
ARMS lacks a specific situational context, it cannot control for potentially heterogeneous risk perceptions 
in assessing risk preferences. The fact that variables representing individual ability and willingness to 
acquire information have a positive influence on risk preferences shows that Likert scale risk attitude 
cannot isolate the effect of risk perception from risk preferences. High value crop farms and risk taking 
are positively correlated, while no regional dummy variables has any significant association with 
individual risk preferences, with the only exception being the Southern Seaboard Region, which has a 
positive association with risk preferences at 10% significance level.  
Dohmen, et al. (2011) estimated a similar model but only included personal characteristics as 
their sample consists of the general population in Germany. The unique dataset from the 2001 ARMS 
allowed us to identify not only individual characteristics of farm operators, but also farm business 
characteristics that explain the global measure of risk preferences for US farm households.  That there is 
no impact of the regional dummy variables on individual risk preferences is not unexpected, but offers a 
new addition to our understanding about farmers’ individual risk preferences.   
4.5.2. Multivariate Probit Model 
Table 4.3 presents coefficient estimates from the multivariate probit model, consisting of three equations: 
use of contracts and crop insurance and off-farm labor participation. We conduct the likelihood ratio test 
that examines the null hypothesis that the error terms in all three equations are not correlated with each 
other. The chi-square statistic for the test has degrees of freedom equals to 3, because there are a total of 
three combinations of two error terms out of three32. The chi-square statistic of 109.619 (p-value < 0.00) 
is clear evidence against the null hypothesis, which justifies the use of multivariate probit model instead 
of three individual probit models. 
                                                        32 Éb[ = [!	[Áb!b! = 3 
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The primary interest in the multivariate probit model is the coefficient estimate of Likert scale 
risk attitude. Likert scale risk attitude has a positive and significant coefficient in contracts and crop 
insurance equations. Contrary to a priori expectation, risk prone farmers are more likely to use contracts 
and crop insurance, two representative risk management strategies in agriculture. In contrast, Likert scale 
risk attitude has a negative and significant coefficient in off-farm labor equation. Note that the dependent 
variable in off-farm labor equation takes a value of one for farm operators whose primary occupation is 
off-farm work. Thus, risk-loving farmers are less likely to work off-farm, which is consistent with the 
widely held view that off-farm work is often considered a less risky occupational choice than farming.  
An important question remains as to why using contracts and crop insurance are positively correlated with 
risk-loving attitudes. We offer a few alternative explanations to this unexpected result.  First, risk 
preferences in general may have two opposing effects on farmers’ decisions to use risk management 
strategies.  For one, risk averseness may impose a negative impact on doing something new, including 
risk management strategies. Risk-loving farmers may be more willing to initiate risk management 
strategies, which, at the outset, may be perceived risky due to contractual and legal complexities involved. 
On the other hand, risk-averse farmers may initially be reluctant to adopt a new risk management strategy, 
but gradually become more willing to adopt it at a greater intensity if it is suitable for reducing and 
diversifying risks. Because all of the dependent variables in the multivariate probit models are binary and 
discrete, our model is unable to capture the possible effect of risk preferences on the adoption intensity of 
risk management strategies, if any. This is the primary motivation to estimate the double-hurdle model on 
contract use, results for which we discuss later in this section.  
Alternatively, as indicated by its inconsistent performance in Bard and Barry (2001) and Fausti 
and Gillespie (2006), Likert scale risk attitude may not represent the true risk preference of individuals as 
accurately as researchers would hope for, despite its simplicity of the question in the elicitation procedure. 
Operator and farm characteristics and regional dummy variables are included to control for factors 
relevant to use of contracts and crop insurance and off-farm labor participation. These variables obtained 
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Table 4.3: Factors Affecting Adoption of Risk Management Strategies 
 
Variables 
Multivariate Probit Model 
Contracts Crop Insurance Primary Occupation 
Likert Scale Risk Attitude 0.019** (0.009) 0.025** (0.010) -0.041*** (0.009) 
Operator Characteristics       
Primary Occupation  -1.800 (0.094) -1.063*** (0.153)   
Raised on Farm 0.060 (0.058) 0.218*** (0.067) -0.351*** (0.053) 
Years of formal education 0.019** (0.010) 0.035 (0.011) 0.063** (0.010) 
Age 0.034*** (0.011) 0.018 (0.012) 0.026*** (0.011) 
Age Squared -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Race  -0.092 (0.083) -0.156* (0.092) 0.208*** (0.080) 
Gender  0.043 (0.096) -0.198* (0.116) 0.227*** (0.084) 
Farm Characteristics       
Total operated acres -0.011 (0.007) 0.024*** (0.008) -0.071*** (0.010) 
Total operated acres squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Certified organic farm  0.218 (0.170) 0.041 (0.181) -0.138 (0.197) 
Debt to Asset Ratio 0.017 (0.015) 0.013 (0.021) 0.012*** (0.015) 
Entropy Index 3.127*** (0.473) -0.693 (0.480) -8.899 (0.665) 
Soil Productivity Index -0.008*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.002) 
Full owner  0.187*** (0.051) -0.586*** (0.062) 0.518 (0.046) 
Tenant  -0.048 (0.061) 0.038 (0.065) -0.105*** (0.072) 
Rate of Return 0.007 (0.019) 0.029 (0.020) -0.054*** (0.021) 
Statement  0.026 (0.048) 0.204*** (0.053) -0.450*** (0.047) 
High Value Crop Farms  -0.263*** (0.070) -0.006 (0.074) -0.259*** (0.081) 
Livestock Farms (excluding Dairy)  -0.116** (0.049) -0.986*** (0.057) 0.388*** (0.046) 
Regional Dummy Variables       
Northern Crescent -0.151 (0.081) -0.874 (0.088) -0.231 (0.085) 
Northern Great Plains -0.475*** (0.096) 0.233** (0.104) -0.422 (0.107) 
Prairie Gateway -0.529*** (0.089) -0.047 (0.088) -0.114*** (0.085) 
Eastern Upland 0.026 (0.084) -0.624*** (0.096) 0.075 (0.081) 
Southern Sea Board 0.463*** (0.090) -0.460*** (0.099) -0.344* (0.091) 
Fruitful Rim 0.044 (0.085) -0.720*** (0.093) -0.140** (0.091) 
Basin and Range -0.408*** (0.115) -0.801*** (0.124) -0.200** (0.112) 
Mississippi Portal 0.156* (0.082) -0.307*** (0.089) -0.205*** (0.090) 
Intercept -0.329 (0.360) -0.779** (0.393) -0.927*** (0.360) 
Number of Observations = 5,162 LR test of m¦ = 0 ∀ , ¢ = 1, ⋯ ,3,  ≠ ¢ 
Log Likelihood = -7,330.317 chi2(3) =  109.619***  
Presented figures are coefficient estimates. Figures in brackets are standard error estimates. 




obtained mostly expected results. We briefly review some interesting results. Age and age squared, 
respectively, have a positive and negative coefficient in all the equations, representing the conventional 
quadratic profile that the effect of age on the dependent variables is increasing at a decreasing rate. Non-
white or female farmers are less likely to purchase crop insurance and instead more likely to work off-
farm. County-level soil productivity index has mixed impacts. Farms located in a county with more 
productive soil are less likely to use contracts but more likely to purchase crop insurance. Farm operators 
in such counties are also less likely to work off-farm, presumably because of a higher opportunity cost of 
farming. Calculating rate of return to farm business and preparing income and net worth statements both 
have a negative impact in off-farm labor equation. A majority of farm type and regional dummy variables 
have significant coefficients in all three equations. A more geographically specific and regionalized 
modeling approach may prove beneficial to obtain further insights into factors affecting the three 
dependent variables. Nonetheless, the model presented here accomplishes the primary objective to assess 
the impact of Likert scale risk attitude on use of risk management strategies, using a large scale 
representative sample of farmers. 
4.5.3. Double-hurdle model 
The unexpected result that risk-loving farmers are more likely to use contracts and crop insurance leads us 
a more flexible modeling approach to delineate the relationship between risk preferences and use of risk 
management strategy. We construct a variable representing the intensity of contract use represented by a 
share of farm income under contracts in the total value of production.33  
Agricultural contracts are important risk management strategies for farmers as they can stabilize 
                                                        
33
 According to MacDonald, et al. (2004), agricultural contracts are arrangement “for the transfer of agricultural 
products from farms to downstream users such as processors, elevators, integrators, retailers, or other farms.”  
Production and marketing contracts are the two of the most major forms of agricultural contracts. While production 
contracts are agreements on production inputs and practices between farmers and contractors, marketing contracts 
specify a pricing scheme and sales outlets for the commodity prior to harvest (MacDonald and Korb, 2011). 
Production contracts are more popular in livestock production while marketing contracts are more widely used in 
crop production (MacDonald and Korb, 2011). Agricultural contracts explain an increasing share of agricultural 
sales. In 2008, production and marketing contracts accounted for 38 percent of the total value of agricultural 
production in the United States (MacDonald and Korb, 2011), up from 36 percent in 2004, and 28 percent in 
1991(MacDonald, et al., 2004). 
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farm income by substantially reducing risks associated with input prices, production, and output prices 
inherent in agriculture. In general, farmers can retain a greater degree of autonomy in marketing contracts 
than in production contracts. Although some agricultural contracts are not designed to reduce risks, the 
risk management aspect of agricultural contracts provides important benefits to farmers (MacDonald, et 
al., 2004). While we are aware that different contracts address various types of risks in agriculture, i.e., 
production risk, price risk, etc, to varying degrees, the underlying assumptions in estimating the double-
hurdle model, therefore, are that any contract is risk reducing than without it and that risk reduction is the 
major motivation for famers to use agricultural contracts. 
The objective of the double-hurdle model is to decompose the relationship between risk 
preferences and contract use into two components: whether or not a farmer use contracts and the intensity 
at which the farmer use them. Our expectation, based on the unexpected results in the multivariate probit 
model, is that risk-loving has a positive impact on the former and risk averseness has a positive impact on 
the latter. Table 4.4 summarizes coefficient and marginal effect estimates from the double-hurdle model. 
Marginal effects are estimated at the means of the explanatory variables. Also presented are standard error 
estimates of the marginal effects, calculated by the bootstrap method described in Burke (2009). In Table 
4.4, Tier 1 refers to whether or not contracts are used represented by equation (9) and Tier 2 represents 
equation (10), corresponding to the intensity of contract use. 
Likert scale risk attitude has a positive and significant effect in Tier 1, but no such effect is found 
in Tier 2. The results here confirm our expectation that risk averseness can be a deterrent to doing 
something new, even if its purpose is to manage risks. More risk-loving famers are more likely to use 
contracts, as it was the case in the multivariate probit model. The marginal effect estimate of 0.010 
indicates that an increase in Likert scale risk attitude by one on the 11-point scale increases the 
probability that a famer uses contracts by 1%. Since the standard deviation of Likert scale risk attitude is 




Table 4.4: Factors Affecting Use and Intensity of Use of Contracts 
Variables 
Double-Hurdle Model 
Tier 1  
(Contract Use) 
Tier 2  
(Intensity of Contract Use) 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Likert Scale Risk Attitude 0.035*** 0.010*** (0.002) 0.004 0.004 (0.003) 
Operator Characteristics       
Primary Occupation  -0.875*** -0.244*** (0.015) 0.002 0.002 (0.020) 
Raised on Farm 0.194*** 0.054*** (0.017) -0.017 -0.016 (0.019) 
Years of formal education 0.001 0.000 (0.003) -0.004 -0.004 (0.004) 
Age 0.031** 0.009*** (0.003) -0.011*** -0.010*** (0.004) 
Age Squared 0.000*** -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** 0.000*** (0.000) 
Race  -0.163* -0.045* (0.025) 0.025 0.023 (0.028) 
Gender  -0.058 -0.016 (0.030) 0.024 0.022 (0.031) 
Farm Characteristics       
Total operated acres 0.002 0.000 (0.005) -0.031*** -0.029** (0.012) 
Total operated acres squared 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** 0.000 (0.001) 
Certified organic farm  0.281* 0.078* (0.046) -0.038 -0.034 (0.060) 
Debt to Asset Ratio 0.015 0.004 (0.039) 0.104*** 0.095*** (0.025) 
Entropy Index 4.813*** 1.343*** (0.165) 0.243* 0.221* (0.129) 
Soil Productivity Index -0.008*** -0.002*** (0.001) -0.003*** -0.003*** (0.001) 
Full owner  0.009 0.002 (0.014) 0.081*** 0.073*** (0.016) 
Tenant  -0.029 -0.008 (0.019) -0.084*** -0.076*** (0.025) 
Rate of Return 0.026 0.007 (0.005) -0.003 0.007 (0.005) 
Statement  0.186*** 0.052*** (0.013) -0.001 -0.001 (0.016) 
High Value Crop Farms  -0.193** -0.054** (0.021) 0.039 0.035 (0.028) 
Livestock Farms (excluding 
Dairy)  
-0.243*** -0.068*** (0.013) 0.207*** 0.189*** (0.020) 
Regional Dummy Variables       
Northern Crescent -0.110 -0.031 (0.024) 0.320*** 0.291*** (0.036) 
Northern Great Plains -0.390*** -0.109*** (0.027) 0.135** 0.123** (0.051) 
Prairie Gateway -0.557*** -0.155*** (0.025) 0.219*** 0.199*** (0.048) 
Eastern Upland -0.005 -0.001 (0.024) 0.286*** 0.260*** (0.036) 
Southern Sea Board 0.601*** 0.168*** (0.024) 0.297*** 0.271*** (0.034) 
Fruitful Rim 0.078 0.022 (0.025) 0.367*** 0.335*** (0.039) 
Basin and Range -0.388*** -0.108*** (0.032) 0.221*** 0.201*** (0.057) 
Mississippi Portal 0.227*** 0.063*** (0.023) 0.248*** 0.226*** (0.036) 
Intercept -0.638   0.885***   
Number of Observations 5, 162 
Figures in brackets are standard error estimates of marginal effects calculated by bootstrap method with 1, 000 
replications.  
*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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In contrast, risk preferences have no significant impact on the intensity at which contracts are used.34 
 A brief comparison of operator and farm characteristics across the two tiers gives us an 
interesting insight. More operator characteristics are significant in Tier 1 than in Tier 2, while more farm 
characteristics exhibit significance in Tier 2 than in Tier 1. It can be surmised that operators’ personal 
characteristics, including risk preferences, play more pronounced roles when it comes to decisions at a 
more fundamental level, such as the one-time decision of whether or not to use contracts. In contrast, farm 
business characteristics may have more significant effects for decisions that have to be made on a 
relatively more frequent basis, such as adjusting the intensity of contract use. 
 Primary occupation has a very significant effect on contract use (Tier 1) both statistically and 
economically; farmers who works off-farm as a primary occupation is 24% less likely to engage in 
contracts. Farmers raised on farm are 5% more likely to use contracts. Age has a positive impact on 
whether or not to use contracts (Tier 1) but the quadratic relationship holds again, indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient on age squared. Interestingly, when it comes to the intensity of 
contract use (Tier 2), age has a negative impact, but the impact is mitigated at higher ages due to the 
positive and significant effect of age squared. Racial minority farmers are 4.5% less likely to use contracts.  
 Total operated acres have a negative and significant impact on the intensity of contract use; a 
1,000-acre increase in total operated acres leads to a 3% decrease in the intensity of contract use, 
measured by the share of farm income under contracts in the total value of production. Highly leveraged 
farms in terms of debt to asset ratio tend to use contracts at a higher intensity; a unit increase in debt-to-
asset ratio increases the intensity of contract use by 9.5%. The entropy index is one of the few farm 
characteristics that have a significant impact in both Tiers 1 and 2. Note that this is a continuous variable 
ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 being no diversification at all and 1 being completely diversified. Enterprise 
diversification can be a risk management strategy by itself, but it has a positive correlation with contract 
use. A one standard deviation (0.048) increase in the entropy index leads to a 6.43% increase in the                                                         
34 We estimated the same double-model separately for marketing contracts and production contracts. Likert scale 
risk attitude obtained essentially the same results in both models: a positive and significant effect in Tier 1 but no 
significant effect in Tier 2. 
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probability of contract use and 1.06% increase in the share of farm income under contracts. As it was the 
case in the multivariate probit model (Table 4.3), the soil productivity index has a negative impact on 
contract use and the negative effect holds true for the intensity of contract use. The probability of contract 
use and the intensity of contract use decrease by 2.76% and 4.15%, respectively, due to a one standard 
deviation (13.835) increase in the soil productivity index. Relative to part owners, who operate both 
owned and rented acres, a full-owner, on average, makes use of contracts at a higher intensity by 7.3% 
whereas a full-tenant does so at a lower intensity by 7.6%. 
Farm types and the regional dummy variables are mostly significant in both Tiers 1 and 2. 
Interestingly, the regional dummy variables have mixed signs in Tier 1, however, in Tier 2, all of them 
have a positive and significant effect, relative to the excluded group of the Heartland region. Although the 
primary interest in this chapter is the relationship between Likert scale risk attitude and actual realization 
of risk preferences revealed through farm business decisions, for a more thorough understanding of the 
factors affecting contract use, a modeling approach specific to regions and farm types may be warranted.  
4.6. Conclusion 
Risk analysis in agricultural economics requires an accurate measurement of individual risk preferences. 
Agricultural economists often rely on the expected utility framework to quantify risk preferences, but any 
proposed measurement of risk preferences is never free from contradiction with the empirical evidence 
(Lagerkvist, 2005). The existing studies in agricultural economics documented inconsistency across 
different measures of risk preferences (Bard and Barry, 2001, Fausti and Gillespie, 2006). The focus of 
this chapter was risk preferences measured on a Likert scale. Although there has been no clear evidence 
of the validity for this variable in agricultural economics, in other branches of economics, risk preferences 
measured on a Likert scale was found a better predictor of actual risky behaviors under various 
circumstances (Dohmen, et al., 2011). A number of empirical studies utilized Likert scale risk attitude and 
obtained theoretically consistent results (Block, et al., 2009, Caliendo, et al., 2009, Jaeger, et al., 2010).  
The overriding theme of the chapter was to examine the validity of Likert scale risk attitude using 
data from a nationwide survey of farm operators. We first estimated the ordered logit models and 
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observed the importance of operators’ personal characteristics such as primary occupation, education, age 
and gender. Their effects are robust to different model specifications. We then estimated the multivariate 
probit model to compare Likert scale risk attitude against three discrete variables representing actual 
realization of risk preferences revealed through off-farm labor participation and use of contracts and crop 
insurance. We unexpectedly found that risk-loving operators were more likely to use contracts and crop 
insurance, for which we posited an alternative explanation.  That is, risk averseness may impose a 
negative impact on doing something new, even if it is to diversify and reduce risks, while risk averseness 
may be positively correlated with the intensity at which farmers are willing to use risk management 
strategies that are proven to be successful for the existing operation.  
In order to empirically test this hypothesis, we examined the two potentially conflicting impacts 
of risk preferences on the adoption of agricultural contracts by a double-hurdle model. The results 
partially confirmed our expectation. Risk-loving farmers are more likely to use agricultural contracts, but 
it has no impact on the intensity at which these contracts are adopted. The finding in this study is 
consistent with the hypothesis in the sense that risk averse farmers are less likely to begin to use 
agricultural contracts, which may pose a considerable amount of risk to those who have never used it 
before. 
The absence of a significant effect of Likert scale risk attitude on the intensity of contract use in 
the double-hurdle model may be attributed to the lack of situational context in Likert scale risk attitude. 
Dohmen, et al. (2011) report that, although Likert scale risk attitude is the most versatile predictor of risky 
behaviors under numerous settings, a measurement of risk preferences catered to a specific context 
always outperformed Likert scale risk attitude. Since data on the intensity of contract use in the double-
hurdle model were available for only those who have adopted contracts, a measurement of risk 
preferences more specific to the contracting decisions may be necessary to better understand the 
relationship between risk preferences and the intensity of contract use.  
As mentioned earlier, farm types and the regional dummy variables mostly obtained significant 
coefficients in both the multivariate probit model and double-hurdle model. Although it is beyond the 
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scope of this study, a modeling approach specific to regions and farm types is recommended for a more 
detailed analysis of the factors affecting use of contracts and crop insurance. Nonetheless, this chapter 
fulfills the primary objective of empirically assessing the validity of Likert scale risk attitude, using a 
large scale representative sample of farmers. This chapter also provides important findings about factors 
explaining individual risk preferences for US farmers and the effect of risk preferences on use of risk 
management strategies.  
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY A
D CO
CLUSIO
S   
The overriding theme of this dissertation was technology adoption in US agriculture. Although 
technology adoption is one of the most widely studied topics in agricultural economics, the present 
dissertation reflected upon the recent social and economic changes surrounding US farm sector and 
analyzed their implications on technology adoption. 
 The focus of the second chapter was the introduction of GM crops in US agriculture and its 
impact on off-farm labor allocation decisions by farm households. GM crops possess traits that are not 
possible through traditional plant breeding, such as herbicide tolerance and insecticide resistance, to allow 
for flexible weed and pest management practices (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006). Among the 
recent innovations in agriculture, GM crops are unique in that they are easy to implement and 
significantly reduce labor requirements. Despite the rapid increase in the adoption of GM crops 
immediately after the introduction in 1996, few studies have explored the impact of the time savings 
made possible by GM crops on farm households’ time allocation decisions. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of GM crop adoption on off-farm labor 
participation by both farm operators and their spouses. Another feature of this study was that we 
quantified the intensity of GM crop adoption instead of using a binary dummy variable. The adoption 
intensity was calculated as the share of GM crop acres, soybeans and corn combined, in the total corn and 
soybeans acres. We utilized data from the 2004 – 2006 ARMS and estimated the bivariate Tobit model of 
off-farm labor supply by farm operators and their spouses.  
The results from the econometric analysis partially confirmed a priori expectation that the 
adoption of the time saving technology, i.e., GM crops, leads to increased off-farm labor supply. We 
demonstrated that the adoption intensity has no significant impact on off-farm labor supply by farm 
operators whereas it has a positive and significant impact on off-farm labor supply by their spouses.  
Since farm operators are, by definition, are the primary decision-makers of farm operation, they are likely 
to have a comparative advantage in farming operation to their spouses, who tend to have less farming 
experience. Therefore, it is plausible that time savings made possible by the adoption of GM crops allow 
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each member of the household to pursue an activity at which he/she has a comparative advantage, 
allowing operators to remain on farm and their spouses to work more off the farm.  Marginal effects 
estimates showed that a unit increase in the adoption intensity of GM crops, i.e., growing no GM crops at 
all to growing GM crops only, results in a 33% increase in the probability of working off-farm by farm 
operators’ spouses. For the spouses who do work off-farm, the same change in the adoption intensity of 
GM crops adds 9.89 hours per week to off-farm labor supply. The econometric analysis in this chapter 
also demonstrated that different sets of variables explained off-farm labor participation decisions by farm 
operators and their spouses. While the variables related to farm operation influence the operators’ off-
farm labor supply more prominently, off-farm labor supply by their spouses is more sensitive to the 
personal and household characteristics such as age, education, and the presence of young children. These 
results suggest that farm operators and their spouses play different but complimentary roles in 
maximizing household utility, further supporting the view that the farm household assigns different roles 
to the operator and the spouse based on their comparative advantages. The chapter provided important 
findings about the impact of the time saving technology in US agriculture and its implication on farm 
households’ time allocation decisions.  
The third chapter builds on the second chapter and considered the adoption of two technologies: 
GM crops as a representative of an easy-to-implement and management-saving technology and precision 
farming as a representative of a capital- and management-intensive technology. Given these two recent 
but contrasting innovations in US agriculture, the primary focus of the chapter was the relationship 
between farm operators’ human capital, represented by years of formal schooling, and the adoption of 
these two technologies. In agriculture, farmers with higher education generally have better access to 
information and knowledge that are beneficial to farming operation. They also tend to possess a higher 
analytic capability to process the information and knowledge necessary to successfully implement new 
technologies and realize expected results. Hence, higher education allows farmers to make an efficient 
adoption decision (Rahm and Huffman, 1984) and be the early adopters who can take advantage of new 
technologies to extract maximum profit (Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). This chapter reconsidered this 
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conventional belief.  We hypothesized that the effect of education on technology adoption could be 
heterogeneous and even be negative. For example, education increases farmers’ human capital and gives 
them more lucrative employment opportunities off the farm, which in turn decreases managerial time on-
farm to implement new technology.  Education, therefore, is expected to have a much smaller impact for 
those farmers who work off-farm than those who do not. Considering the facts that the number of farmers 
with college education has been steadily increasing over the past five decades (Mishra, et al., 2009) and 
an increasing share of farm household income is derived from off-farm sources (Fernandez-Cornejo, 
2007), it is crucial to accurately assess the effect of education on technology adoption. 
 Using data from the 2006 ARMS, we estimated the bivariate probit model to examine the factors 
associated with the adoption of GM crops and precision farming. In doing so, we employed the 
propensity score matching method proposed by Mayen, et al. (2010) to address the endogeneity issue. The 
technology adoption model featured interactions between education and the dependence on off-farm 
income, with the expectation that the dependence on off-farm income influences the effect of education 
on technology adoption. The results confirmed a priori expectation and demonstrated very contrasting 
impacts of education on the adoption of the two technologies. The effect of education on the adoption of 
precision farming was positive for full-time farms, but much smaller for part-time farms that are more 
reliant upon off-farm income. When it comes to the adoption of GM crops, the effect of education was 
found negative for full-time farms, contrary to our expectation, but less negative for farms that are more 
reliant on off-farm income. Given the increasing federal spending on agri-environmental programs that 
encourage farmers to adopt environmentally benign practices over the last two decades (Cattaneo, et al., 
2005), a precise assessment of the effect of education on technology adoption is necessary.  Our findings 
suggest that simply targeting highly educated farmers to promote new technologies on the basis of the 
conventional theory is not sufficient to achieve an efficient policy outcome. Of particular importance is 
the nature of the technology, i.e., management and labor requirements, and the farm household’s 
dependence on off-farm income. With the increasing trend in off-farm labor participation among farm 
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households in the United States (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007, Mishra, et al., 2009), the heterogeneous 
impacts of education on technology adoption may become more prominent in the future. 
As a caveat to the second and third chapters, it is important to note that diffusion of technology is 
a dynamic process (Rogers, 2003) and thus results from these chapters may only be applicable to the 
specific timeframe of the data analyzed. Studies using more recent data may provide a different picture of 
how education and time allocation decisions influence the adoption of GM crops and precision farming, 
which deserves further academic attention.  
 The conceptual framework in the second and third chapters was based on the agricultural 
household model introduced in the first chapter. While the model proved useful for the objectives in these 
chapters, a caveat was the assumption of risk neutrality among farm households. The fourth chapter, 
therefore, sheds light on the role of individual farmers’ risk preferences in technology adoption. The 
central difficulty in risk research in agricultural economics is how to measure individual risk preferences. 
A wide variety of methods have been proposed to measure farmers’ risk preferences, but any proposed 
method is never free from contradiction with the empirical evidence (Lagerkvist, 2005). The 
measurement of risk preferences used in this chapter was of qualitative nature. Specifically, the 
respondents were asked to choose a number between 0 and 10 on a Likert scale to represent the level of 
risk at which they are comfortable in making decisions, with 0 being “avoid risks as much as possible” 
and 10 being “take risks as much as possible.” Although the validity of self-reported risk attitudes such as 
this one is in questions for several reasons discussed in Chapter 4, a recent study by Dohmen, et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that risk preferences measured on a Likert scale is the best all-round predictor of risky 
behaviors.  
Using this qualitative measure of risk attitudes measured on an 11-point Likert scale found in the 
2001 ARMS, we estimated three econometric models to identify the factors explaining individual farmers’ 
risk attitudes and the effect of the risk preferences on the adoption of risk management strategies. We first 
estimated the ordered logit models and observed the importance of the operators’ personal characteristics 
such as primary occupation, education, age and gender. We then estimated the multivariate probit model 
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to compare Likert scale risk attitude against three discrete variables representing actual realization of risk 
preferences revealed through off-farm labor participation and use of contracts and crop insurance. The 
results unexpectedly showed that risk loving operators were more likely to adopt contracts and crop 
insurance. The plausible explanation we proposed for this surprising results was that risk averseness may 
impose a negative impact on doing something new, even if its purpose is to diversify and reduce risks, 
while risk averseness may be positively correlated with the intensity at which farmers are willing to use 
risk management strategies that are proven to be successful for the existing operation. The third model, a 
double hurdle model, was estimated to empirically assess the hypothesis that there are two potentially 
conflicting impacts of risk preferences on the adoption of risk management strategies, using agricultural 
contracts as an example. The results partially confirmed our expectation. Risk loving farmers are more 
likely to use agricultural contracts, but it has no impact on the intensity at which these contracts are 
adopted. The finding in this study is consistent with the hypothesis in the sense that risk averse farmers 
are less likely to begin to use agricultural contracts, which may pose a considerable amount of risk to 
those who have never used it before. As suggested by Dohmen, et al. (2011), a more context-specific 
measure of risk preferences may be more appropriate to explain the intensity of contract use. In addition, 
the fact that Likert scale risk attitudes obtained significant coefficients in all of the three models estimated 
in this chapter attests to its potential as a valid measure of risk preferences for risk research not only in 
labor economics and entrepreneurship literature but also in agricultural economics. Although the results 
were only partially consistent with our expectation, this chapter fulfilled the primary objective of 
empirically assessing the validity of Likert scale risk attitudes, using a large scale representative sample 
of farmers.  
 Finally, the contributions of the empirical findings provided in this dissertation are summarized. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, our society is fundamentally dependent on agriculture as it is the 
primary source of the nutrients essential to human activities. Adoption of new technologies alters 
production function, enhances productivity, and allows farmers to produce more output with less input. 
As a consequence, more wealth is produced and conserved resources from farm production can be used 
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elsewhere to produce other goods and services, which would contribute to enrich the quality of our lives. 
In order to secure sufficient supplies of food and fiber products, policy-makers are required to have a 
good understanding of the factors associated with technology adoption. The understanding is also 
indispensable for the well-being of the consumers whose lives are profoundly dependent on affordable 
foods that are healthy and of good quality. 
Although the geographical focus of the empirical analyses presented in this dissertation is limited 
to the United States, their implications are not. Poverty reduction, the first of the Millennium 
Development Goals put forth by the United Nations in 2000 (United Nations, 2012), is arguably the most 
imminent global issue the current generation faces. Given the fact that a vast majority of the poor in 
developing countries are heavily dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, improving production 
efficiency in agriculture is the key to reducing poverty in these countries. Consequently, it is extremely 
important to understand the factors affecting technology adoption in agriculture. Technologies such as 
genetically modified crop varieties and precision farming considered in this dissertation are already 
widespread in US farm sector, but yet to be fully accepted in many other countries. The practical benefits 
of the simple and qualitative measure of risk attitude considered in the forth chapter may be more 
pertinent to risk research in developing countries. Findings from this dissertation may prove beneficial for 
policy makers in countries that are introducing or will introduce these technologies to forecast their 
potential impacts on the agricultural sector and the rest of the society. It is with my sincere hope that this 
dissertation makes humble contributions to improve the well-being of those involved in agriculture, both 
producers and consumers, not only in the United States, but elsewhere in the world.  
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